^ffTMh-' 



Madlit'^I 



►-:-l^:: 




J\Ir. J\Iadison's War, 



DISPASSIONATE INQJJIRY 

INTO THE 

REASONS ALLEGED BY MR. MADl^jiK 

FOR DECLARING AN / 

OFFENSIVE AND RUINOUS WAR 
AGAINST GREAT-BRITAIN. " 

TOGETHER WITH 

SOME SUGGESTIONS 

AS TO A 

PEACEABLE AND CONS^ 
OF AVERTIJS^G THAT DI 

BY A NEW-ENGLii 



<*Poor is his triumph, and di 

Who draws the sword fc 

And poorer still those f 

Who at a tyrant's noc* 

lor them though we 

Though'' France "ai 

Though twice ten iiat: 

Virtue disowns them, a 

For them no prayers arc 

No blessings chaunted fron. a 

Blood marks tlie path to their unlii.ieiy bier ; 

The curse of orphans and the widow's tear 

Cry to high Heaven for vengeance on their hesd, 

Alive deserted, and accurst whea dead." 



SECOJ\''D EDITJOM 

BOSTON : 

PRINTED BY EUSSELL ^ CUtLBP. 

i9i2. 



M' 



introdmIpion. 




± j^FTER the following pages were ptttj|;o press, most interest- 
ing information was received from Europe', which, as it serves lo 
illustrate, and confirm the opinions of the writer, as it will put to 
the test the sincerity of our administration, as it m ill enable us to 
decide, whether the real object of •the present war is to protect 
the commercial rights and interests of the United States, or to 
promote the views af France, and in systematic co-operatioli 
Mith her; and as tl^fcntelligence more especially and distinctly 
prov^;s, that the Berlin and Milan decrees were not repealed at the 
i'lme wlien they were professed to be, but that their repeal, if it 
lia . '. • fakr)i ejx'cf, was only the result of our " coinmon measures 
adojUcd against the common enemy," as M. Tiirroau justly eliar- 
acleri^ejl them, we trust \\e shall be excused for devoting a fe^v 
pages to the examination of this recent intelligence and of its bear- 
ing upon the existing situation and policy of the United. States. 

Sometime in the month of May last (1812) Bonaparte publish- 
ed a decree purporting ta bear date April 28, 1811, j» "which re- 
citing, as its SOLE cause, that " Congress had by their aet of 
March 2, 1811, declared that British ships and'meri^kandise 
slio'ild hi interdicted an entry into the ports of the U. States," and 
reciting further, " that the aforesaid law of Congress is an act of 
resistance to the liritlsh Ordei-s in Council,''^ he proceeds to decree, 
that " the Berlin a.id Milan Deer-.es are definitively (from the 
first of November last) considered as no longer in force as far as 
respects American vessels." The phraseology is indeed curious — 



tliere are no voids of repeal or revocation — but it is simply de- 
clared, that the decrees are considered as no longer in force so far 
as respects American vessels. NotAvithstanding this his Majestj 
may seize their cargoes and condemn them with a much smaller 
violation of his imperial word than we have sometimes seen. 

Various, numerous and important are the thoughts to which 
this singular ex post facto drci-ee gives rise, aYid if some of them 
hear hard on ^)ur administration, \^ ho have just entered into an 
avowed co-operation and concert with France, they are indebted 
to their new ally for these reflections, and not to us. 

The first and most obvious inquiry is, Mas this decree really 
passed in ^7irj7, 1811, though not promulgated till May, 1812 r 
or is this a decree ante-dated to promote any politicaj and sinisfer 
views ? 

If bona fide issued on the day of its date, why was it with- 
held from our minister, Mr. Russel, who was during the months 
of May and June, 1811, urgjug the French goveniment to give 
some substantial proof of the repeal of the French decrees ? Why 
was it kept back from the nation which upon the face of it was 
the only one aifeeted by it i In June, isil, Mr. Russel informed 
the French minister, that he kept the J^hn Adams in waiting 
S(Aehj that she might carry out to the United States something that 
might satisfy our people that the decrees were repealed. Yel om 
the 14th of July all he could obtain was the release of two ves- 
sels which did not come under their operation, but of fire others 
captured after November, 1810, and coming within the decrees, 
not one of them was then, or has been yet released. 

Mr. Barlow soon after arrived in France, a nuin better suited 
fiian Mr. Russel to conduct a negociation in whicli the United 
States were to yield their independence to France. He also in 
very suppliant strains from August, 1811, to February, 1812, 
urged the Emperor to furnish some jiroof of the repeal of the Ber- 
lin and Milan decrees. Yet his Imperial Majesty did not reccol- 
leci\ or did not see fit to furnisli the simplest and best possible 
answer, liis pretended decree of April, 1811. 

If that decree had been furnished, Britain probably would have 
/<j«nf since repealed her orders in council, ajid this disastrous way 



OX.dL ■>Vv<}J,Cvv.a t 



might have been avoided. If tliat decree had been promulgated 
t]»e courts of France, Naples and Holland would have restored 
the numerous vessels captured or seized under the Berlin and Mi- 
lan decrees., and ivithoitt that decree they could not do it. For 
Gen. Armstrong declared in one of his letters, that the council of 
prizes stated to him that they could take no otiier evidence of the 
repeal of the decrees, than a solemn imperial edict which should 
annul them. Why then, was this evidence ivithheld ? We shall 

give our own suggestions as to <Ve reasons presently We had 

not tlien promised to enter into the war ! ! 

But we ask further, why if the decrees were repealed so far as 
respects Americans, his Majesty in person condemned the Cathar- 
ine, Ockington, owned by John Parker Esq. of Boston, and others » 
and four other ships and cargoes taken in the Baltick, under pre- 
tence of having been boarded by British cruisers,or being laden with 
the produce of enemies colonies, in September, ISllj five months 
after the date of the pretended decree of repeal ? 

Again, if the decrees were repealed in April, 1811, why, ii not 
communicated to us, who were specially interested, and to the w orld, 
were they kept in the Emperor's cabinet till 1812, and not com- 
municated either to his court or his Minister of Marine, when the 
event to which they referred happened in March, 1811 } AVhy did 
Feretiei*-s squadron which sailed in January, 1S12, nine months 
afterwards, sail under the repealed decrees "} Why were they order- 
ed to capture, sink, burn and destroy every American vessel which 
had traded to an enemy- s port ? Why was the brig owned by the 
Messrs. Curtis's of Boston, destroyed by that squadron, and a 
dozen others, whose losses have been paid by our underwri- 
ters ? Why did the Emperor in his official speech to his senate, 
lately referred to by Mr. Foster, as late as March last, still de- 
clare them to be the fundamental laws of his empire } How 
could they be repealed, and yet in force i There was no other 
nation but America, on whom they would operate, and yet he de- 
clared them last March, the laws of liis empire. 

In short, this measure may be considered the climax of French 
injustice and intrigue. While their decrees which operate against 
us are instantly promulgated, and have sometimes a retrospective 



tendeiicv, this pretended /flroi/ra6/e decree is conliued to tlic Ein- 
[KM-i»r"s breast for thirteen months; or rather, as we shall presently 
sliew. tlie price j'iven lor it was an assurance of a declaration oC 
war, and it was miie-duted to cover the honnnr oi'one of the hiu;h 
contract ins; parlies. 

But this is the narrowest and most favonrahlc vicAv of this 
strange transaction. Tliere are liglits in whidi it ought to be 
considered w hich bear as hard upon our administration as they do 
upon France. 

Bonaparte announces as the sate g.ound of \\\i> prd ended rc^t^-dX 
that our act i\{' .March 2, 1811, was a resistance of the orders in 
council. But it w ill be rpmeniuered that the sole ostensible, and 
the onlt/ plausible, though unjust ground of our act of March, 1811, 
was the previcus revocation of tlie French decrees, on the ±st oj 
J^ovember, 1810. 

So then we h-ave this extraordinary state of the case. 

Congress in May, ISIO, passed a law pretended to be impar- 
tial, w hich provided that the non intercourse act should cease as 
io tlie nation which should Jirsi reiJeal its decrees, and that it 
should operate on the other which sliould fail so to do. 

]Mr. Madison declared the French decrees repealed in Novem- 
ber, 1810, and Congress in pursuance of its pledge to France, and 
supposing the decrees repealed in November, 1810, passed the 
non importation act of IMarch 2, 1811, operating only against 
Great Britain, and therefore in effect making war upon her alone. 

France, regardless of the character or consistency of our ad- 
ministration, now declares that her decrees were not repealed un- 
til April 28, 1811, and then insultingly tells them that it is only 
in consequence of our act of March 2, 1811, which act was pass- 
ed as is jirnfersed onhj in consequence of the supposed and alleged 
jjrpiv'oMS repeal of tlic Berlin and ISIilau decrees, in November, 
preceding. In any o//iO' view, that act would have been a shame- 
ful example of partiality, 

Tluis it seems th.at in addition to the bitter pill of war, we are 
compelled to swtvllow this most nauseous and disgusting dose — 
we are to admit that our retaliation upon France was first with- 
drawn, hfore she would consent to repeal her decrees, and Mr. 



Madison declared to the Morld that her decrees were repealed, 
'.vluch she now says were not repealed inilil after we adopted 
what she directed, that is, measures of resistance against her ene- 
my's orders, which Mere second in point of date, and increlj re- 
taliatory. 

If this is not a triumph of France over our pride, our hoiiour, 
our character, onr justice, our interest, and our liberties, I confess 
I do not know wJiat acts could amount t;) such a triumph. 

We have now taken one view, and not a very honourable one 
either to France or onr own administration, of this news. From 
this examination it will appear to every man not wedded to France 
or to party views — 

1st. That the French decrees were never in fact repealed till 
this very last month of Mat/, when the repeal m as issued. The 
well known execution of tliem by French officers and hy the em- 
peror in person, renders the pretence of repeal, only an insult on 
our understandings. 

2d. That the ante-dating the repeal was intended to screen or.r 
administration ; but the pride of France overcame lier desire to 
save Mr. Madison. She did not dioose to have it appear in the 
face of Europe, that she repealed her decrees without a quid pro 
quo — without a salvo for her own honour. 

She, therefore, alleges on the face of this repeal, that our re- 
sistance to Britain was the sole moving cause ; m hile we found 
our resistance of Britain upon the previous repeal of her decrees. 
How these anachronisms, or contradictions of dates, are to be re- 
conciled, we leave to the Gallo-American chronologists to explain. 

But there is a more seHous light in ^liich this topick must be 
viewed, and if the declaration of Mar aroused our fears and ex- 
cited our jealousies, surely this event of tlic coincident, and late, 
and reluctant, and strange repeal of tlie French decrees is not 
cileulated to quiet or allay them. If France could have foreseen 
that before her repeal of the Berlin and ^Viilan decrees could reach 
America, war would be declared by Mr. Madison against Great 
Britain^ — If ii copy of his war message, and an assurance tjf his 
determination to engage in Mar, cotdd have been transmitted by 
fhe Wasp,Mhich is now in France: Mhy, cvez\vma,n will perceive 



that Bonaparte'^isht very safely repeal his Berlin and Milan de- 
crees — because those decrees only forbade our trade with Enghuul, 
and a war bet*., oen us and her would do that much more efteetual- 
Iv. Now we <J!o XK»t say that f/ils tt7as the ease; hut we do say 
that it would ;iot be more extraordinary than Mr. Madison's con- 
duct in the case we have just considered, in declaring the French 
decrees repealed six months before our eammon master now sayS 
they were e\ er pretcr.ded so to be. 

But there is a collateral fact which puts this question, in my 
opinion, at rest. ISlr. Bailow did tell an American gentleman in 
Paris, in May last, thirty days before the declaration of war in 
this country, that war was, or would be declared immediately by 
Asnerica against Great Britain ; and advised him to regulate his 
concerns accordingly ; and that gentleman did write to his friend* 
iu Salem to take measures for his exchange in case he should be 
taken prisoner on his return. This looks serious I ! How did 
Mr. Barlow, in France, know this fact last May, whe« we pri- 
vate citizens had no suspicion of it, in this country? The an- 
swer will be found in our succeeding pages — by the same means 
by which Armstrong, in France, predicted the embargo, sixty days 
before it was proposed here — by a secret understanding between 
our administration and that of France. There is an eyid then t© 
this mystery. The decrees which were to be fundamental laws 
of the empire expire. Why .^ Has the emperor's purpose chang- 
ed } No America having declared ivar at his order, there is no 

inu£i;er any nation on Avhom they can operate. AVho ever doubt- 
ed tliat they would be repealed as to us when we should declare 
w ar against England } and we see them so admirably well timed 
as to reach this country amidst the roar of cannon and in the 
horrors of war. 

Rii« there are one or two other still more interesting questiontj 
arising out of the late intelligence. What will be the conduct of 
Great Britain in couscquenee of this queer sort of ex post facto 
repeal of the Frencji Decrees ; this declaration, that they have 
hern repealed during the last year, wlien they have been much more 
ejectually euforrcdthan at first ? Will she consider this repeal ; 
(cnnpl'd as it is m ith the declaration every moment falsified by the 



IX 



fact, thatthey have been so repealed for tliirteen months hack) will 
Ave consider such a nominal repeal, which amounts (o nothing 
more than the previous deelaralion of the emperor as eomin?^ 
within the pledge she has made to repeal lier orders ? Can thi« 
be called a practical repeal in 1811, when the snips burnt by 
Feretier are still smohhn^^ 9 

If she should so consider it, and should repeal her orders m 
council, will it change the measures of a«r government ? Will it 
give us peace ? or will our administration still iasist on othci 
claims and resist any oft'ers of arccommodation ? 

These are important questions — (hey arc in the lips of every" 
man, and it may not he considered impertinent to say a word os- 
two upon each of them. Tliis may serve to sliew that the ques- 
tion of the orders in council has not lost all its interest, even if 
they should be repealed. Besides they may be revived again in 
case we should dare to make peace without the consent of France, 
for France would in that case revive her decrees with more rigor, 
and Great Britain would probably again retaliate on her enemy. 

In the first place then, if Great Britain should repeal her or- 
ders upon this nominal, ex post facto declaration of France, it 
would be a proof of her strict attention to her promises. It must 
be recollected, that this measure, should it take place, will only 
l)e the result of her own sense and justice, and her regard to her 
engagements, and not the effect of our hostile measures wliieh 
could not have been known in Great Britaiji. 

It will be a signal proof of /iPr desire to preserve peace wrth this- 
Country, and of her disposition to restore freedom of trade to an 
enslaved, and humiliated world — Bat she )»« y not think that a de- 
cree of France of so extraordinary a nature, so retrospective in its 
operation, and which assigns onthe/«cp of it, a reason so insulting 
to her and to us ; that is, that America had resisted her retalia- 
ting orders, and for that proof of loyalty was entitled to indulgence, 
sufficient to warrant tlie repeal of the orders in coflucil. If she 
should hesitate upon this ground, what would our administration 
say .-^ If the friends of the Prince Regent now restored to power, 
if the very men who have opposed the orders in Council, and a\ hose 
speeches have' been republished here with so much praise by \\\e. 



I'riemls of our adrainistratiou, slioukl see through the thin veil 
with which this transaction is covered, it they should say, " that 
although opposed to the orders iu council yet wlien we see it avowed 
on the face of the repeal of the French decrees, that tliey are repeal- 
ed merely i)ecause America resisted our orders in council, our hon- 
our forbids our acquiessing in sucli signal injustiee,"^ liat would our 
administration say ? What ought all honest men to say ? Ought 
they not to say this is a shameful intrigue with France and 
does not in the smallest degree vary tlie merits of the original ques- 
tion, as to the decrees of France and orders of Britain ? 

But suppose a ministry not pledged to support the orders in coun- 
cil, but avowedly opposed to them, should, as it is possible tliey may 
overlook the insulting reasons assigned by France for the late, the 
very late repeal of her decrees, should bona fide and absolutely 
rescind the orders in council. Would our cabinet instantly pro- 
pose or assent to peace ? It could not be said tliat war is 7iow un- 
dertaken, and v,e must in honour contend for our other smaller 
pretensions, because in the supposed case, Britain will ha^ e with- 
drawn her orders before she kneiv of the war. 

Shall we then continue at Avar to maintain our doctrine as to 
impressments, and to force Britain to give up her system of par- 
tial blockades ? If we do, then it will be manifest, that we go to 
war for points which Mr. Madison himself in his arrangement 
with Mr. Erskiue did not include, and which he thereby declared 
he thought were not violations of our neutral rights. In short, 
then it will be manifest, tliat the war is undertaken not for our 
interests, but for those of France. 



I 



AN 



INQjUIRY, &c. 



I HAVE been in my early days honored by my fellow 
citizens with the office of a representative in the legislature 
of my native State, a State dear to me by early associations, 
by having been the place of my nativity, by containing the 
ashes of my revered ancestors through six successive gene- 
rations, by possessing within its bosom all the fruits of my 
own and their industry, and upon the prosperity of which 
State my children, yet in their infancy, depend for their 
hopes of future success. These solemn considerations have 
created an attachment to it, which neither the frowns of men 
in power, nor the temporary, and I hope remediable misfor- 
tunes, into which our rulers are about to plunge it, can 
essentially wedken or impair. The oath administered to 
me in my capacity of a legislator, was, " that the State of 
Massachusetts, is and of right ought to be, a free, sovereign, 
and independent State" — and this solemn oath, taken be- 
fore an assembled people, and in the presence of the Su- 
preme Being, I consider a sacred pledge that I will defend, 
uphold, and maintain the rights and interests of this State 
against all hostile attempts whatsoever. To me, it is a matter 
of indifference, whether the attack upon these rights proceeds 
directly and openly from the great usurper and common ene- 
my of all civilized States, or whether the same be made 
through the partiality or the mistakes of the men whom a 
majority of our citizens have unfortunately elevated to 
ill- deserved power. 



It is my object in the following remarks to shew, that 
whether the influence of France, directly or indirectly ap- 
plied, or whether the mistaken policy of our administration, 
without such influence, has occasioned our difficulties, the 
measures lately adopted by a small majority of our national 
rulers are not only without reasonable justification, and 
destructive of our best interests and dearest rights, but 
are a misapplication of the powers entrusted to them ; 
and therefore it belongs to us, the people, to decide 
whether such measures deserve our approbation and sup- 
port, or whether they will justify us in a temperate but 
firm and decided opposition — Whether, in short, the evils, 
which are certain and inevitable from a support of the 
present policy, are not infinitely greater in extent than any 
which we could possibly incur by a constitutional apd re- 
solute resistance. Let not the timid be alarmed at the out- 
set, by the idea of open resistance, of insurrection, of 
unjustifiable opposition. I contemplate no such measures. 
I have in view only those constitutional principles which 
the ijsages of our ancestors, both in Great-Britain and in 
this country, and their successful example, have sanctioned. 
I ask only for the application of the principles of Mr. 
Locke, and for the imitation of the example of those great 
men who have gone before us, in cases of smaller pressure, 
and of less importance to the vital interests of their country. 

Having made these general observations, I shall state the 
particular order of my remarks, which will be. 

First, a candid examination of Mr. Madison's manifesto 
to Congress, which impelled that body reluctantly to the 
declaration of an offensive war against Great Britain. 

Under this head, I shall consider the various allegations 
of Mr. Madison against Great-Britain, and I shall shew, 
that the charges are greatly exaggerated, and that they 
might all ofthem^ xvithout exception^ have been healed and 
adjusted, if the administration of our country had been dis- 
posed so to do— that these causes of complaint have not 
only been suffered to fester and spread, but that they have 
been irritated in complaisance or at least in conformity with 
the expectations and wishes of France. 



Secondl}', I shall consider the expediency of the war, 
both upon the supposition of its being' successful and un- 
successful. 

Thirdly, I shall contend, that if the administration have 
contemplated a war against Great-Britain for several months 
.past, (and no new cause of irritation exists against her 
which has not existed for live years,) it was their solemn 
duty to have made preparations for it, by providing an ad- 
equate marine force in order to protect our commerce now 
exposed without relief to the depredations of our powerful 
enemy — by permitting the return, and facilitating by every 
means the restoration to our country of all the property of 
our citizens abroad — by warning the merchants of the in- 
tentions of the government, and thus preventing the enor- 
mous sacrifices which will inevitably be made in conse- 
quence of their ignorance of such secret hostile intentions 
and purposes. 

Fourthly, I shall shew that in a war, offensively and un- 
justly undertaken, the subject is not only not bound to en- 
gage, but that it is his duty to abstain from taking a part 
in it. 

Lastly, I shall point out the legal and constitutional 
remedy to which the citizens may and ought to resort in 
this calam^itous case of misconduct in a small majority of 
their rulers. 

When I first read the manifesto of the President against 
Great-Britain, I confess that it was difiicult for me to de- 
cide which feeling was most predominant in my mind, 
mortification or indignation. Mortification, that our nation 
should be disgraced in the eyes of the whole world and 
of posterity by such a tissue of exaggerations— and indig- 
nation, that artifices of this sort should be resorted to in 
order to dtceive and irritate the people, and to drive them 
into a ruinous war of an offensive nature, and (what is still 
more to be feared) into an alliance with France, which is 
more dreadful than a century of war. I was astonished at 
Mr. Madison's boldness and his contempt of the under- 
standings and information of the people, in thus daring to 
make a discolored and extravagant representation of events 
and circumstances which have so recently passed under 



the eyes of the whole nation. I was indeed prepared to 
expect almost any thing from this author of the crusade 
against England — his proclamation, declaring to the people 
that the French Berlin and Milan Decrees were revoked on 
the 1st of November, 1810, when he knew that France 
had never even promised to revoke them until we should 
*' cause our rights to be respected," that is, as Mr. Madison 
has since construed it, declare xvar against Great-Britain, 
had opened my eyes in some measure as to his character — 
I had lost much of my respect for his political veracity, 
and of my confidence in his public assertions — His mes- 
sage with respect to the pretended discovery of Henry 
confirmed my suspicions. 

Instead of honorably acquitting the citizens of Boston, 
as he ought to have done, of any participation in Henry's 
views or designs, he boldly asserts, that " Henry was em- 
ployed in intrigues with disaffected citizens in the United 
States, having for their object a subversion of our Gov- 
ernment, and a dismemberment of the Union." 

Now he well knexv at the time he penned that sentence, 
(and he has since repeated the same sentence in the mani- 
festo) that Henry expressly declared that he never opened 
the subject of his mission to any citizen of the United 
States. 

A man capable of so insidious and unfounded an asper- 
sion on the citizens of his own country, on men who will 
not yield to him in patriotism or spirit, might well be ex- 
pected to be little scrupulous about the terms he might use 
towards a foreign nation, especially when those terms of 
reproach fall in \vith the passions of the ignorant part of 
his supporters, whom it has been the business of their 
leaders to inflame and to deceive. 

The partiality displayed in this manifesto — the black 
and bloody representation which is therein made of the 
conduct of Great-Britain, precisely adapted to gratify the 
malice of her deadly enemy and the enemy of all free 
states — and the brief, mild, and apologetic style with re- 
spect to the wrongs of France, bring to my recollection 
many events in the history of Mr. Madison's public con- 
duct, which combine to produce a strong apprehension in 



my mind that he habitually inclines to the views and inter- 
ests of France more than becomes the magistrate of a free 
and independent state. I shall hereafter shew, that his last 
act of plunging us into the present war,is altogether for the 
benefit o^ France \nfact^\ho\i^\ it may not be in hiteiition — 
that we can in no possible event be gainers by it, but that 
it is a sacrifice of our commerce, our agriculture, our 
money, and our lives, for no other good than to make a 
diversion of the British forces favorable to France^ (and 
perhaps some men look farther^ to the subjugation of their 
own country) and in that light it ought to be considered 
one of the most alarming attempts ever yet made against 
whatever little there is left of liberty, virtue, and religion 
in the world. 

If I succeed in shewing this, if I satisfy every reasonable 
man that this xuar of Mr. Madison is in eifeet a French 
war, and not an American one, that it is undertaken for 
French interests, and in conformity with repeated French 
orders, and at the sacrifice of our own best interests, and 
probably of our liberties, we shall have no very great diffi- 
culty in condemning it. I shall state nothing but what I 
have learned from unquestionable authority, nothing which 
I cannot support by indisputable proof. 

Mr. Madison early in life became a member of the rev- 
olutionary Congress. That body was then divided into 
two parties — the French party, of which Mr. Madison 
was a leading man, who were in favor of bending all the 
efforts and energies of the country to promote the views of 
the French cabinet, views which the French government 
in 1793 declared to have been "the fruit of a base specu- 
lation^ and that our glory at that time offended the ambi- 
tious designs of France." The other party was truly 
American^ seeking only the establishm.ent of our national 
independence and prosperity ; at the head of this American 
party were the members from New- England. Mr. Mad- 
ison was one of the party who proposed and carried the 
instructions to our ministers abroad not to make any 
peace without the consent and concurrence of France. He 
was also one of those who opposed the treaty of peace 
made by Mr. Jay and Mr. Adams, and who, in conipH • 



8 

aace with the wishes of France, attempted a censure upon 
those ministers for having dared to negociate a most ad- 
vantageous and honorable treaty without the concurrence 
or consent of the French cabinet. Such ^vere Mr. Madi-" 
son's early predilections ; such was the promise which he 
presented of his future policy. After the establishment of 
the present constitution, Mr. Madison again came into 
the councils of our nation. We there again find him true 
to his first opinions, and resolutely bent to promote the 
measures which favored the views and interests of France. 
In 1794, he was one of those who strenuously opposed 
Gen. Washington's pacific mission to Great-Britain ; he^ 
was m favor, as he is njw, of direct hostility with that 
kingdom, in favor of the sequestration of British property, 
and opposed to every measure which could heal the breach 
between the two countries. 

In the same year he brought forward his famous re- 
solutions against Great-Britain, the whole scope and ob- 
ject of which were to make a warfiire on British commerce, 
and to please the revolutionary rulers of France. They 
were in their character precisely like Bonaparte's conti- 
nental system, and like the corresponding, cooperating 
measures of embargo and non-intercourse, so ineffectually 
yet so ruinously attempted by Mr. Jefferson and himself 
in later periods of our history. It was Mr. M:idison who 
wrote the pamphlet against the author of "War in Dis- 
guise," in which he arraigned with great severity the 
British doctrine as to the colonial trade. Yet we have seen 
this same man, within three years after, apologize for the 
French decrees as merely municipal regulations, of which 
the United States, he says, have no right to complain, al- 
though these decrees cut up by the roots that very colonial 
trade, for which, while Great-Britain was concerned, he 
had been so strenuous and warm an advocate. This gen- 
tleman, so acrimonious against Great-Britain for modifying 
the manner in which we should carry the j^roduce of 
French colonies to the parent country, who represented it 
as of vital importance to the United States — at a subsequent 
period when France not only saw fit to cut off all this car- 
rying trade to her own country,but to march her armies into 



Holland, Italy, Hamburg, Denmark, Prussia, Spain, and 
Portugal, for the purpose of destroying our legitimate trade 
with these y;7>;2Gf/y and neutral states, not only was pleased 
to acquiesce in this injustice, but has publicly defended the 
conduct of France, as a legitimate exercise of unquestion- 
able sovereignty. 

What ? Shall a neutral state not only feel indifferent to 
the successive oppressions and conquests of all other states 
situated like herself, but shall she admit that the lawless 
victor has a right to interdict her own trade with those 
oppressed and neutral states ? Shall she go farther, and 
condemn, as Mr. Madison has done, Great-Britain for pro- 
hibiting a trade with her open enemy ^ and yet apologize for 
France, who has by force of arms cut us oft' from the trade 
of neutral and friendly states who would, if left free, court 
and solicit our commerce with them ? 

Yet such is the picture of Mr. Madison's conduct in 
relation to the two belligerents, before he had the boldness 
to come out and declare himself on the side of France, 
before he dared to tell this people (as by his measures he 
has done) that their fortunes must be hereafter inseparably 
attached to those of Bonaparte, and that we must be tied 
to the chariot wheels of tliis conqueror in his triumphal 
entry into his capital. 

I shall omit Mr. Madison's declaration to Mr. Randolph, 
that "France wants money and must have it," and a thou- 
sand other incidents of the same character tending to shew, 
that his opinions and his policy are too much connected 
with those of his new ally, Bonaparte. 

I have said enough for those who are open to conviction, 
and those who are not will nevertheless be shaken when 
they come to the measures which he has lately adopted to 
produce a war Avith Great- Britain. 

I now proceed to the consideration of his manifesto of 
M'^ar. 

The first point in Mr. INIadison's manifesto, and which 

forms the most prominent part of it, relates to the British 

doctrine and practice of taking their own seamen out of 

our merchant ships. He has collected under tliis head, all 

2 



10 

tlie virulent remarks which the obscure writers of his part}" 
have used for many years past. Before I consider his as- 
sertions on this point, it may be useful to trace the history 
of this pretension and practice on the part of Great Britain. 

All the nations of Europe maintain without any excep- 
tion this doctrine, "that their subjects have no right to 
expatriate themselves, and that the nation has a right to 
the services of all its citizens, especially in time of war." 
This doctrine is not only maintained and enforced by all 
sovereign states, but it is explicitly laid down by writers 
on general law, as most unquestionable. 

Grotius, Vattel, Puftendorf, and all other public writers, 
concur in maintaining this right. France has a special code 
on the subject, and every citizen is enrolled from the time 
be is capable of bearing arms, and is recalled by special 
proclamation, as soon as a war breaks out, from the service 
of foreign countries. 

Denmark, on entering into the present war, issued a 
similar proclamation. There is no civilized country on 
the globe which does not claim the right to the service of 
all its citizens in time of war. 

When the war broke out between Great-Britain and 
France, in 1793, a new case arose — a case unexampled in 
the history of nations. America, once a part of the British 
empire, speaking the same language, havmg the same 
habits, occupied in the same pursuits, remained at peace- 
The profits of neutrality enabled us to pay greater wages to 
our seamen than Britain could possibly afford. The British 
seamen who had ne\er before been tempted to desert the 
standard of their country, because the language, habits, and 
usages of the continental nations were so diverse and disa- 
greeable to them, flocked by thousands into the x\merican 
mercantile service, and produced a serious and distressing 
injury to Great-Britain. It is the opinion of well-informed 
merchants, that thirty or forty thousand British seamen 
sought employment in American ships. Great-Britain 
found this evil intolerable, and she adopted the expedient 
of reclaiming her own seamen found in our merchant 
service ; disclaiming, howe\'er, most explicitly, the right to 
take them from our public armed ships. 



11 

This practice she commenced under die administration 
of Washington, and hi;s continued it from that day to the 
present. She has, however, always disclaimed the preten- 
sion of taking ''Americaii" seamen, and if the case has 
sometimes and unfrequently occurred, she has always ex- 
pressed her regret, and has restored the men so taken, on 
due and proper proof of their citizenship. 

The evil, however, has been of very limited extent, and 
the bona fide American citizens have been tlie least dispos- 
ed to complain. The Northern States who employ for the 
most purt n.iVi\ e seamen have suffered very Uttle, and I 
have known several merchants in extensive business who 
never had a seaman impressed from their shi^^s during a 
twenty years war. 

There is one fact of great importance to be considered 
before we enter into Mr. Madison's representations on this 
subject, and that is, that neither General Washington nor 
Mr. Adams thought this matter of sufficient importance to 
make it the subject of a special communication to Congr-ess, 
much less did they think it reasonable cause of war. It is 
a well known fact also that Great Britain has been growing 
more and more cautious in the exercise of her right of re- 
claiming her seamen, and fewer instances of impressment 
have occurred within Mr. Madison's administration than 
before. Just before the war measure was resorted to, Mr. 
Foster, the British ambassador, requested our government 
to furnish him a list of impressed seamen calling themselves 
Americans, that lie might procure their immediate release. 

Now let us pause and consider this question in the ab- 
stract. A belligerent and neutral nation speak the same 
language, and have the same general character. The bel- 
ligerent wants her citizens for the defence of her existence. 
The neutral wants them for profit — The neutral offers 30 
dollars per month, and the belligerent can afford but 15^ — 
The belligerent loses 40,000 seamen, which the neutral har- 
bors and employs. 

The belligerent assumes the right to reclaim her o\vn 
subjects, and so far as respects them she is right ; she is suj)- 
ported by the law of nations, but in the exercise of this 
right instances of mistakes or misconduct will occur; ought 



L.ofC. 



i2 

the neutral to complain unless she takes effectual measures 
to prevent the entry of the seamen of the belligerent into 
her service ? Much less ought she to complain, if she en- 
tices by high rewards and coimtenanccs by fraudulent pro- 
tections such seamen of the belligerent in deserting the 
standard of their country. 

Yet such is the fact, well known to every man on the 
sea coast^ — Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, employ three foreign seamen to one American ! 
Yet these are the men from whom our complaints proceed ! 

Nor is this all — our government give occasion to the very 
complaint of which they make so much parade. It is a 
fact, acknowledged by our marine officers, that a large pro- 
portion of the seamen in some of our national ships are na- 
tive British seamen, and it is even asserted that many of the 
warrant officers are of that description. 

Can a government, which at least does not check such 
abuses, such an attack on the resources of a belligerent, 
such an important inroad on his rights, legitimately com- 
plain of his occasional abuse of the undoubted power of re-t 
claiming his own citizens ? 

Much less can such men fairly hold a moral and pathetic 
discourse on the cruelty of compelling men to fight 
against their brethren, when they know that British subjects 
are first seduced from their allegiance, and then compelled 
to turn their arms against their sovereign and fellow sub- 
jects ? 

Yet such is the fact — Vast nimibers of British seamen 
v/ill be now ordered out by the President to slaughter the 
subjects of their own sovereign, and if captured will be lia- 
ble to be hung as traitors to their king and country.* 

Mr. Madison in his manifesto in favor of war, says, that 
the British government have assumed a jurisdiction on the 
high seas instead of a resort to the respo?isible sovereign, 
which he would have us believe would have been effectual. 
But have not the British government repeatedly complain- 
ed to ours of the abuses which have existed as to the en- 
ticement and enlistment of their seamen, and has the re- 

* In New-York, an Englishman on board our frigste Es^ex was tarred and feath- 
ered because he would not violate Lis oatU of nl!egiani;e. 



13 

sponsible sovereign^ the United States, everafibrded them aii 
adequate remedy ? Have our laws interdicted the employ- 
ment of British seamen, or have they thrown any obstacles 
in the vvay of that system of seduction of British sailors 
which has been so injurious to their marine ? We know 
that they ha\'e not. 

The President, living in a slave State, proceeds to com- 
pare this case to that of property seized on the high seas, 
and to intimate that the seamen ought to be caiTied in for 
adjudication like other property, instead of being subjected 
to the decision of military otlicers ; but we would ask, 
would this alleviate the burden ? w ould it be more profit- 
able to our merchants and convenient to seamen to' be car- 
ried into a British port in order to exhibit the proofs of their 
citizenship, because perhaps there might be one or tw-c Bri'- 
ish seamen on board, rather than to \\d\t such seamen taken 
out at sea on accpunt of their unquestionable character, or 
because they were destitute of protections ? 

Much is said by Mr. Madison of the severities of the 
British discipline, and of the hardships of our seamen being 
compelled to serve in distant climes and to be the melan- 
choly instruments of taking away the lives of their fellow 
citizens. This is very pretty rhetoric ; but still it is well 
know^n, that great numbers of our citizens voluntarily enter 
into the British marine service, and not unfrequently aug- 
ment the mass of those who complain of having been forced 
into British employ. 

But says Mr. Madison, against this *' crying enormity 
" the United States have exhausted in vain remonstrances 
" and expostulations, and they have offered to enter into 
" arrangements, which could not be rejected if the recovery 
*' of British subjects were the sole and real object — But 
"the communication passed without effect." 

This sentence, if it has any meaning, was intended to 
convey to the people the idea that Britain, besides the re- 
claiming of her oxvn seamen, had an ulterior and furtlier 
object which can be no other than strengthening her marine 
by the impressment of our seamen. — Now there ne\'er was 
a more unfounded suggestion, and Mr. Madison had in his 
possession the documents to satisfy him of it. 



14 

The whole number of sailors pretended to have been 
impressed from our ships for fifteen years past was 6258, 
out of 70,000, and of which all but 1 500 have been restored. 
Of this remainder, at least, one half are probably British 
seamen, and of the residue it is probable that at least another 
moiety entered voluntarily. It appears however from the 
returns that not more than 1500 seamen, including British 
subjects with fraudulent American protections, were at any 
one moment in British employ. 

The whole number of British seamen in their marine, or 
public ships only, is 150,000, and in their merchant ships, 
over whom they have a perfect control, 240,000. Is it 
probable, we ask, that for the sake of gaining 1500 seamen, 
they would hazard the peace of their country ? It must then 
be that the reason why they insist upon this right is, that 
they would wish to check the disposition of their own 
seamen to enter into our service, of whom, it is admitted on 
all hands, we have at least from 30 to 50,000. 

But, says Mr. Madison, our proposition to arrange this 
aifair on reasonable terms passed without notice. 

This is a most unfounded assertion — It is a fact that both 
during the embassy of Mr. King and of Mr. Monroe, the 
British government manifested a disposition to arrange this 
dispute in a manner satisfactory to both countries. 

And Mr. Monroe explicitly states, tliat Lords Holland 
and Auckland had proposed to him the basis of an ar- 
rangement which they were ready to make on that subject, 
and which he believed would be satisfactory to the two 
countries. 

On this point then, Mr. Madison's representations are 
extreme!}^ unfair and unreasonable. 

Such is the true and well known picture of tlie ques- 
tion of impressment, ^^'hich Mr. Madison presents in the 
fore ground, as if it was of primary importance and tl^ 
principal cause of the late declaration of war. 

Yet this evil, such as it is, is of seventeen years duration, 
and was much more extensive in its actual 0})eration when 
the illustrious Washington signed and ratified Mr. Jay's 
treaty than it is now. 



15 

We do not however mean to leave the qnestion here — 
If the war is undertaken on this ground, it must be for the 
rehef of the American seamen. Three fourths of them are 
citizens of New-England and New- York. Yet we find 
that the people of these states are tlie most averse to the 
war, the least clamorous on the subject of these impress- 
ments — This ought at least to create our surprise, and 
this astonishment will be heightened when we know that 
all this sensibility proceeds from men who perhaps never 
saw a seaman, whose States furnish Twne^ who have done 
every thing in their power,by embargo and non-intercourse, 
to impoverish those very seamen for whom they profess so 
tender a concern. 

Lastly, this prominent cause of war strikes us w^ith the 
greater astonishment, inasmuch as we know that its first, its 
certain, its inevitable effects will be to drive out of the coun- 
try three quarters of all our native seamen, to compel them 
to enter into the service of our enemy, and to fight in those 
very ships, and against those very brethren, and to incur 
those same calamities which Mr. Madison with apparent 
distress pretends to deplore. 

It is indeed an extraordinary spectacle to find so disinter- 
ested a concern for commercial and nautical men on the lips, 
I will not say in the hearts^oiowv rulers,and at the same time 
so universal a detestation, so cordial an execration of these 
kind, affectionate and sympathetic measures in the breasts 
of those who alone are pretended to be the objects of this 
kindness. 

For my own part, I consider it a mockery of the suffer- 
ings of the merchants and the sailors, for the known and 
avowed enemies of commerce and of seaforing men, towage 
an unnecessary and destructive war, a war ruinous to com- 
merce and to navigation, under the pretence of supporting 
the commercial rights and of vindicating the wrongs of the 
merchants and sailors. The merchants and sailors however 
are not deceived by such pretensions — They know the 
deep hostility of the men ^vho propose such steps to all 
commercial prosperity, and they consider these measures as 
resulting rather from an ill-judged contempt of their opin- 
ions and a disregard of their sufferings tiian from any sincere 



disposition to afford them redress, a redress which they 
know and the administration well understand can never be 
obtained, but will be prevented by the declaration of war 
against Great Britain, a measure fatal to the eastern and 
navigating states. 

I shall pass over at present the complaint of Mr, Madi- 
son of the practice of British ships of hovering on our coast, 
and the exaggerated picture which he gives of the evils 
which have resulted from that practice — -I shall however 
resume that subject when I come to the point of the exclu- 
sion of British ships of war from our waters, at the same 
time that we gave protection to French cruizers, and per- 
mitted them to arm in our ports, and to make hostile ex 
cursions from our ten-itory, not only against the British 
trade, but against our own defenceless commerce. 

I rather prefer to discuss the principal point of dispute 
between the two nations, the obnoxious and much decried 
orders in council — the same course will be pursued on this 
point as was taken with respect to impressments — I shall 
first trace the history and ground of those orders before I 
consider the distorted picture which Mr. Madison and the 
committee of Congress give of them. 

Firt then, let me remark, that in December 1807, when 
the orders in council were first known in this country, they 
were received by both parties without surprize or emotion. 
The natural sense of justice which all men felt, before their 
passions were enlisted against tlicu"!, made every man ac- 
knowledge and in some degree acquiesce in the justice and 
propriety of that retaliation which Great Britain at a late 
day and with visible reluctance adopted. 

Even the administration themselves in their early discus. 
sions with G. Britain on the subject had not got their cue, 
had not learned that it was to become so prolific a topic 
of complaint. The mercliants soon accommodated them- 
selves to this new state of things, and justly attributed to 
the anti- commercial and tyrannical principles of Bonaparte 
the partial and comparatively unimportant restrictions on 
their trade, and it may safely be affirmed and indeed proved 
from official documents, that if our administration had not 
entered into Bonaparte's continental system, if they had not 



17 

cboperated with him by permanent embargoes^ non- 
intercourse, and non-importation, our trade would scarcely 
have felt any considerable check to its wonted prosperity. 

It may especially be remarked, that tht federal party 
generally^ in the first instance, acknowledged the justice 
and indeed moderation of Great Britain in relation to her 
retaliatory orders, not only in her delaying to issue them for 
twelve months after she had given formal notice of her 
intention so to do in case her enemy should persevere in 
enforcing them, and we in submitting to them, but also in 
refraining from giving to them the enormous, unjust and 
unparallelted extent which France had given to her de^. 
crees. 

The clamors of the partizans of France, the dread of pop- 
ular resentment has to be sure made some few federal- 
ists since waver, and we have seen with no sm^ll surprize, 
that as in the case of the British treaty so unjustly con- 
demned, some of our political friends have been treasuring 
up sources of future regret, and have been strengthening, 
without intention, the hands of their opponents. 

It is my design to consider this subject from its founda- 
tion, and if men are disposed to censure, let them at least 
read, and see if they can answer in their closets the argu- 
ments — Let them divest themselves of their national pre- 
judices and view this question as some future Grotius, 
PufFendorf or Bynkershoek would examine it. 

I take it to be a conceded principle that belligerent rights 
are in their nature paramount to those or neutrals, precisely 
because the one is contending for liis existence, the othef 
merely for his convenience, • his accommodation or his 
profit. A man wlio is drowning would be fully justified 
in seizing hold of the garment of another, although at the 
risk of soiling its beauty or disturbing its arrangement. 

On what other principle is it, that a belligerent has a right 
to seize the property of a neutral going to a blockaded port ? 
or to confiscate articles the actual property of a neutral, be- 
ing contraband of war, going to the relief of an enemy ? 
The right of the neutral is here undoubted — It was a per- 
fect right in time of peace, yet by the imiversal consent of 
nations this right is surrendered to the superior claims and 



IB 

necessities oi' belligerents. Before the invention of cannon 
it could not have been unlawful to have carried an iron 
tube, yet since that has been converted into an instrument 
of warfare it has become a violation of belligerent rights. 

It must then be conceded, that if a state of things should 
arrive or happen in which the trade of a neutral with one 
belligerent should be absolutely incom|)atible with the 
prosecution of the war on the part of the other belligerent, 
he would have as much right to interdict it as to prohibit 
relief to a besieged place, and if the case could be conceived 
that the interdiction of such neutral trade would be a more 
effectual means of reducing an enemy than the taking oj a 
besieged place^ the right to prohibit such trade would be a 
still higher one than that of prohibiting the entry into a 
blockaded or besieged fortress. 

Another point is equally clear, that it is the duty of a neu- 
tral to treat both belligerents with equal favor, and even if, 
through weakness, he suffers one to take an advantage of 
him to the injury of the other, however hard the doctrine, 
it is nevertheless true, that the other has a perfect right to 
take the same liberty if it be necessary to his security. 

Thus for example, if one belligerent should be suffered 
by the United States to seize and fortify Castle William, in 
the harbor of Boston, and should make it a rendezvous 
from which to annoy his enemy, the other has a perfect 
right to seize Governor's Island, in order to counteract the 
efforts of his enemy. 

To apply this doctrine to the orders in council — When 
Bonaparte issued his decree at Berlin, Denmark, Prussia, 
Hamburg and Holland, were at least nominally, and of right 
by treaty, free and independent States— we had a right to 
trade with them in British goods — we did in fact carry on 
a vast and profitable trade with them as we lawfully might ; 
but Bonaparte maixhed forces into these countries who 
were our friends, and compelled them by arms to refuse us 
this trade. This was a wrong done to us in two viervs 
— First, because it was a general injury done to all free 
States, and by the law of nations ^ve had a right to com- 
plain of it. Secondly, because it deprived us of a most 
valuable branch of trade, the very trade about which 



19 

we had before been quarrelling with Great-Britain — I mean 
the carrying trade. We had therefore a right to complain 
on our own account. 

But, thirdly, it was a serious unjury to Great Britain — so 
serious, thixi Bonaparte boasts in his SenatusConsultum, of 
the 16th of Mraxh last, that it will finally destroy her. 

In fact, it was both intended and avowed as a hostile 
measure aimed at her existence. 

Great Britain called upon us to resist iti — we had a right 
so to do, as I have shewn, because it was an injury to us — 
she had a right to require us so to do bectiuse it was an 
injury to her through our rights. 

What said our cabinet ? Why, it is a mere municipal^ 
right — it does not belong to us to resent it. France may 
do what she pleases on the continent if she lets us alone on 

the OCEAN. 

Is this true ? Is this the law of nations ? Can France 
march armies into every neutral and peaceful State with 
whom we have commercial connections ? Can she say to 
Spain and Portugal, you shall not take American flour, or 
cod-fish, or sugar, or coffee ? Can she say this to Holland 
and Hamburg, or rather could she liave done it before the 
ANNEXATION of thcm to France, when they were as much 
sovereign and more independent of her than we are, and 
shall her enemy not be permitted to say, you shall not trade 
with France ? 

Is it an offence on the ocean to use force to forbid a neu- 
tral from trading with your enemy, and can you lawfully 
march an army into a foreign country and forbid a neutral 
from trading with his old friend who is not the enemy of 
the belligerent ? I confess I cannot see a stronger case than 
this, of the right of Great Britain to retaliate her enemy's 
injustice on himself. Ahhough all men admit the injustice 
and the tyrannical character of the French decrees of Berlin 
and Milan, yet the right of Great- Britain to retaliate this in- 
justice upon her enemy, (if perchance it should affect the 
profits of neutral merchants) has been denied on various 
grounds, and as we arc about to undertake a war in support 
of the French Jecrees, and in opposition to the British re- 
tahation of them, it may be useful to consider these several 
objections to the claim of Great-Britain. 



20 

The first ground is, that France had not the power, did 
not possess the means of enforcing her decrees, that they 
were therefore to be considered a mere brutum fuhiien, an 
empty threat, and could not for that reason afford a reason- 
able excuse to Great Britain for retaliating them, since she 
on the other hand could most effectually execute her coun- 
tervailing orders. 

The second ground is, that Britain sQX\ht first example 
by her order of May, 1806, and therefore was deprived of 
the plea of retaliation, and must be considered as the first 
aggressor. 

The third is, that the United States never did submit to 
the French decrees, though they did not resist them — that 
they were not obliged to resist them, if incompatible with 
higher interests of which they were the exclusive judges. 

I believe that I have fairly stated all the objections to 
the British orders, and I shall proceed to give the plain 
answers of a New-England farmer to all these objections, 
premising howxver, that I discuss this question not for the 
purpose of defending Great Britain, but of disseminating 
correct notions of the dispute between England and France, 
with the latter of whom our government have chosen to 
take sides. 

As to the first objection to the British orders, the inability 
of France to execute her decrees, and therefore their inno- 
cent character, I would observe, first, that this rule would 
be the most vague, uncertain, and therefore unjust measure 
of right. It would be to adopt a principle which is never 
admitted in any other case either of morals or legislation — 
To measure the criminality of a deed by the power of the 
party to execute it, would be most unjust, capricious, and 
liable to the greatest uncertainty. If France, from the 
superior force and vigilance of her enemy, has been enabled 
to burn, sink, and destroy only fifty of our ships vrho have 
committed the deadly sin of trading with her enemy, and if 
this degree of weakness renders the French decrees legiti- 
mate, or at least innocent, pray will any of the states- 
men who condemn Great-Britain on this ground, give us 
the arithmetical rule bv which we arc to kno\v \\hcn such 



21 

outrageous violations of national law become the fair sub- 
ject of retaliation ? 

Suppose, instead of the existing inequaHty as to naval 
power, France was able to keep a flying fleet of burning 
ships constantly on the ocean, and in place of ffty^ she 
should burn five liundred ships a year for the enormous 
transgression of selling their surplus produce to the excom- 
municated English nation, would this vary the question of 
right ? In the latter case, it is obvious that neutrals would 
be deterred from supplying Great Britain, and she would 
most essentially suffer. But can her rights depend upon 
so loose and vague a criterion ? Do ayii/ 7'iglits repose upon 
so varying and shifting a foundation ? 

Great Britain reasoned, as all men of prudence reason : 
"This is a novel and most enormous pretension — this is 
"no less than an avowed attempt to shut me out of the 
"pale of civilized nations. She adopted the prudent 
"maxim, Obsta principiis, oppose the first inroad on my 
"rights." And I would ask, where is the judicious and 
honest statesman, who will point out the precise mark at 
which she ought to have acted ? Ought she to have waited 
until the evil was brought home to her doors, until her 
deserted ports and ruined commerce would warn her that 
her ca-se was without remedy ? 

France, from the commencement and until the present 
time, has executed her decrees to the utmost extent of her 
power, and she at this moment boasts of their wisdom and 
efficacy in humbling and enfeebling her enemy, and still 
confides in their sufficiency to destroy him. 

But this is only ow(? answer, though 1 think a satisflictory 
one to this objection. Bonaparte had two distinct modes 
of enforcing his decrees ; one of them was limited by his 
naval power, the other had its full operation on the conti- 
nent. If he had confmed his decrees to his own territory, 
still Great Britain would have had a right to complain and 
to retaliate. Nations have an undoubted right to stipulate 
the terms upon which foreigners shall visit their country . 
but if, under color of this right, they should make an entire 
revolution in the code of international law, if in place of 
those prudent maxims of general policy which nations 



22 

sometimes adqpt, they should substitute a novel and mon- 
strous system, injurious to all free commerce, should throw 
us back to the measures of dark and uncivilized ages, with 
the avoxved purpose of destroying their enemy, not only that 
enemy and all civilized states have a right to complain, but 
are bound to resist. 

Bonaparte did this— he declared, not simply that he w^ould 
not suffer British goods to enter his country, but that any 
neutral ship, which should in any former voyage subsequent 
to his decree have been concerned in trading with Great 
Britain, should be denationalized, and for that cause should 
be confiscated if ever she should enter his ports. Is this a 
mere municipal regulation ? Suppose Great Britain had 
submitted to it — in ten years her trade would have been 
destroyed, or at least materially affected. 

This principle, more dreadful than the Popish doctrine 
of excommunication, has been likened to the navigation acts 
of Great Britain, acts which simply limit the importation of 
British products to British bottoms ; but you may search 
the history of Algiers, Morocco and Tunis in vain for any 
example of the extended tyranny and profligacy of the de- 
crees of France. 

Put then their operation on the ocean out of the question, 
take them as they iwxv ai*e admitted to be enforced, even 
by Mr. Madison, they are the most enormous violation 
of all neutral rights, and the greatest invasion on the prin- 
ciples of modern civilized nations which the world has ever 
seen. 

Yet this operation of the decrees has been justified by 
Mr. Madison, though it is tenfold more injurious to us than 
all their possible effect on the ocean. 

But Great Britain, as well as America, had a still further 
right to complain of these decrees, and they have been 
most dreadfully enforced by the arms and influence of 
France, in Holland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Prussia and 
Denmark. The captures in Denmark alone are more than 
five times as great in amount as all the captures under the 
British orders in council in the first four years of their ope- 
ration. Would Denmark have issued an order for the cap- 
ture of American ships laden with the produce of British 



2 



o 



Islands, without the instigation of France? We know she 
would not. There is an end then to the argument that 
France could not enforce her decrees, because she has done 
it in a most extensive and calamitous degree, and as we 
have before remarked, we cannot see that a robbery done 
upon the land in neutral states, is in any respect less a rob- 
bery or less atrocious, than if committed upon the ocean, 
which is a neutral highway for all nations. 

We now proceed to the second reason alleged, why 
Great Britain could not lawfully retaliate the injustice of 
France, and that is, that she by her blockade of May, 1806, 
became the/r^^ aggressor, and therefore is precluded from 
setting up the plea of retaliation. 

This is the argument which assumes such a rhetorical 
and flourishing figure in the report of the committee on our 
foreign relations. This pretence may do very well for 
weak minds, and it is only fitted for such. Those of us 
who have memories and some knowledge of facts cannot 
be deceived by it. It is perhaps one of the most affrontive 
arguments that was ever thrown in the face of an intelligent 
people. 

In the first place, we would observe, that the idea of the 
blockade of May, 1806, being a violation of our rights 
or an infringement of the law of nations, never made its 
appearance within our hemisphere, until July, 1810, more 
than four years after the said obnoxious order had been in 
full operation. Now it must have been a singular sort of 
invasion of our rights, which neither the fault-linding cab- 
inet of France, nor the still more jealous and irritable coun- 
cil at Washington had for four years been able to dis- 
cover. Yet such is ihtfact. I have formerly perused all 
the correspondence between our government and that ot 
Great-Britain, and I do not recollect that this blockade ever 
formed a part of our complaints. 

2dly, I distinctly recollect that Vvhcn Mr. J. Q. Adams 
thought it necessary to defend the administration and to 
attack the orders in council, he did not dt.re trust liimscU 
on the modern plea of the British aggression of May, 1806, 
but he more prudendy went backward, and rested the de- 
fence of France on the British adjudications m the 7var of 



s-1 

1756. There \vcre among us so7ne, who thought that he 
might as well have urged the mvasion of France by Ed- 
ward the Bl:\ek Prince. 

3dly. But what ought to set this question forever at rest 
and to crimson the faces of oiu' administration and com- 
mittees, whenever they bring forward this argument, is this, 
that Mr. Monroe, our minister then resident at St. James's, 
communicated this order with great satisiaction to our 
government, and expressed his conviction that it was a 
favorable measure, and indicative of the disposition of the 
British cabinet to conciliate this country. 

In trutji it was the measure of Mr. Fox, and was intended 
to give a proof to America of his disposition to recon- 
cile, if possible, the commercial interests of America with 
the principles absolutely essential to the British power and 
existence. It is an order very singularly expressed, but 
it was zmderstood mid intended and executed in such a man- 
ner as to leave open all our trade with France and Holland, 
except such as the admitted principles of the law of nations 
forbade. 

Lastly, with due submission to the honorable com- 
mittee of Congress, I will venture to assert, from positive 
knowledge, that this blockade was as vigorously enforced, 
and as fully supported by actual investment, as the law of 
nations recognised by ourselves require? . 

This, if it be true, (and every captain who entered the 
channel knows it was so,) (the President's assertion to the 
contrary notwithstanding, )/j?^f^ an end to the whole question. 
For Great Britain admits that if the blockade was not 
actual, it was illegal, but she contends it was actual', 
and the premiums at our insurance offices against vessels 
violating that blockade will prove diat it was stricdy with- 
in the modern definition, that is to say, that the "entry into 
the ports so blockaded was imminently dangerous." 

I have one more remark to make on this subject of the 
order of May, 1806, and then I sha^J quit it. I belie^■e the 
remark is new, at least I may claim the merit (if there is 
any) of being its author, and that is, that the idea of the 
blockade of May, 1806, having been a justifiable cause of 
the French decrees was for the iirst time suggested by our 



25 

government through General Armstrong to France^ m 
1809. That cunning cal)inet instantly seized the pretext, 
and from that moment, and never before^ have pretended 
to justify their decrees on the order of May, 1806. 

We shall shew hereafter why our government suggested 
this excuse to France, when \ve come to the proof that in 
all the proposals of accommodation made to Great Britain 
certain conditions have been invariably annexed, which our 
cabinet had previously ascertained would be rejected and 
ought to be rejected by Great Britain. It would be im- 
proper to anticipate this part of the subject which deserves 
a separate consideration. 

The last reason against the orders in council which I 
have heard urged is, that we did not submit to the Berlin 
and Milan decrees. Those decrees interdicted our trade 
with England, yet in despite of France we still traded with 
her, and as to any other mode of resistance we had not the 
means, or if we had, we were at liberty to choose our own 
time and manner of doing it. 

To this I answer, that as to the British trade, we pursued 
it only because it was profitable, and not for the purpose 
of proving to France that we despised or opposed her 
decrees. So far were we from despising those decrees, it is 
a humiliating truth that France has unremittingly inflicted 
qpon us the severest punishment for trading at all with 
Great-Britain, although we had narrowed that trade by our 
own laws in a manner that cooperated essentially with the 
designs of the French government. She did this by arms, 
by the law of strength — we had adequate peaceable means 
of. redress, or at least such as we have thought powerful 
against Great-Britain — ^^'e neglected to use them. If 
Great-Britain, notwithstanding this acquiescence, had no 
right to retaliate on France, because we might be incident- 
ally though not intentionally injured, then it will follow that 
neutrals hereafter may be as p^irtial as they please, and that 
the most unjust belligerent may always wound or possibly 
ruin his enemy through the sides of the neutral. 

I have now fimished my general remarks on the subject 
of the orders in council, and shall proceed with my obser^ 
\ations on Mr. Madison's manifesto. 
4 



26 

Mi: Madison, not satisfied with calling the orders in 
council a complicated and transcendent piece of injustice 
and an innovation, without taking the slightest notice of 
the prior French decrees which occasioned them, proceeds 
to declare, "that they have been moulded and managed as 
"might best suit the political views of Great-Britain, her 
'-^commercial jealousies, or the avidity of British cruisers ;'^ 
thus intimating that her commercial jealousy of tis, and a 
desire to satisfy the cupidity of her naval men, were among 
the prominent motives for the modifications which the de- 
crees have undergone. 

This is illiberal and unfounded. The orders in council 
have undergone no modification whatever since their date, 
except that of April, 1809. It was as well known to 
Mr. Madison when he wrote this charge, as it is to all the 
commercial ivorld, that the modiiication of April, 1809, so 
far from tending to restrain our trade, opened to us the 
Baltic, the German Ocean, the French and Dutch foreign 
possessions, Spain, Portugal, and part of Italy. Could 
Great-Britain have been actuated by commercial jealousy 
in this measure? Yet it is the only change which has taken 
place in the orders in council. The same remark may be 
made as to the desire to gratify the avidity of her cruisers. 
Was it the way to effect this purpose to limit and restrain 
the orders in council to one quarter part of their original 
extent ? Hints have often been thrown out in Congress,, 
and by the President in his manifesto, that plunder was the 
main object of the British orders, and it has even been 
insinuated that Great-Britain has drawn a part of her sub- 
sistence from her captures of American property. 

This slander may do for the ignorant baek-woods-men 
of Kentucky, more ferocious than their savage neighbors ; 
but mercantile men all know, that the orders in council 
were scarcely executed in a single instance till within the 
past year; and in an official return to Congress, it appeared 
that the amount of captures by the British was not half 
equal to those either of France or Denmark. But, says 
Mr. Madison, and in this he is echoed by the committee 
of foreign relations, successive experiments were made to 
see if Great- Britain would repeal- her orders in council.. 



27 

by dfFering to place her adversary exclusively under the 
operation of our restrictive system ; nay, he adds, encour- 
agement was given to her "that a repeal of the orders in 
council would be followed by a xuar against France, unless 
she also should repeal her decrees." 

Now as much of the merits of this question depend 
upon the fairness of these offers, and since if the govern- 
ment of the United States have bona fide made proposals of 
this nature which ought to have satisfied Great-Britain, 
we are wrong in charging them with partiality, it is im- 
portant that we consider this question distinctly and accu- 
,rately. 

We understand the offers not only in a diff"erent but in a 
very opposite light. In the summer of 1809, the cmbai'go 
was reluctantly v/ithdrawn in consequence of the formida- 
ble and decided opposition of the Northern States. In its 
pl'.ice was substituted the non- intercourse act, nominally 
against both belligerents, though effectually only agaiiibt 
Great-Britain, in which it was provided, that in case either 
of them should repeal its obnoxious edicts, the President 
should abolish the restrictions as to the one so repealing 
them, and they should be in full operation as to the other. 
In communicating this measure to the two cabinets, the 
President saw fit to adopt a very different language to the 
x)ne from that which he used to the other. To Great-Brit- 
ain he authorized Mr. Pinkney to say, that in case Great- 
Britain should repejil her orders in council, it was proba- 
ble the President would give effect to the powers vested 
in him by that act, which simply extended to a notifica- 
tion of the fact of repeal, and the law itself declared that 
,the act should remain in force against France. But there 
Avas not the slightest intimation diat in such an event the 
United States would declare war against Franee. There 
is one other circumstance worthy of notice in this commu- 
nication to Great-Britain in 1808, and that is, that no notice 
was taken of the blockade of May, 1806, which has since 
made so conspicuous a figure in the list of our wrongs. 

Yet it will be observed, that the President was not cm- 
powered to oflfer to withdraw the non -intercourse until 
Great-Britain should have repealed all her decrees violating 



28 

our neutral commerce ; but as Mr. Jefferson did not in 
1808 demand the repeal of the blockade of May, 1806, 
the inference is irresistible, that he did not then consider it 
a violation of our neutral rights. The same inference may- 
be drawn from Mr. Madison^s arrangement with Erskine, 
which did not include the blockade of May, 1806, although 
it ought to have included it if it was a violation of our 
neutral rights. So that we have the construction of two 
successive presidents, Jefferson and Madison, that the 
blockade of May, 1806, was not a violation of our neutral 
rights. 

While Mr. Jefferson only held out to Great-Britain the 
prospect of a probability that he would give effect to the 
powers vested in him by the act against France, which 
only extended to the continuance of the non-intercourse, a 
measure perfectly useless to Great- Britain, since her fleets 
already made a much more effectual non-intercourse, he 
authorized Gen. Armstrong to assure France, in distinct and 
unequivocal terms, that if she should repeal her decrees, 
and Britain should refuse to rescind her orders, the United 
States would take part in the war on the side of France. 

These are solemn truths, and on record in the department 
of state. 

But the second negotiation on this subject, which took 
place in 1810, was still more extraordinary. Although the 
blockade of May, 1806, had quietly slept as we have shewn, 
absolutely approved of by Mr. Monroe, and censured by 
no one, not even by France ; although it did not make its 
appearance in the negotiation of 1808, nor in Erskine's ar- 
rangement in 1809 ; yet it was destined to make a great 
and principal figure ill \^\0. This must strike every per- 
son with astonishment, that a great and overwhelming 
wrong both to us and to France should have been forgotten 
and neglected by both for the space of four years. Yet 
this blockade was coupled with the orders in council, and 
with such other pretensions in 1810, that no settlement 
could be made with Great-Britain. I now proceed to the 
proof of these assertions. 

From the time of the promulgation of the French decrees 
of Milan and Berlin, we can find t\o intimation on the part 



29 

of France either of her dissatisfaction with respect to the 
limited order of Great-Britain, of May, 1806, or of her 
determination to consider its repeal an indispensable con- 
dition of the repeal of her hostile decrees. 

The first notice taken of it, as far as we can find, is in a 
letter from Gen. Armstrong to Mr. Smith, our Secretary of 
State, of January 28th, 1810, in which he details a conver- 
sation which he had held with Count Champagny, the 
French minister. 

In th.it letter Mr. Armstrong refers to a letter of Decem- 
ber 1st, 1809, from Mr. Smith to himself, -which has never 
been published^ in which he is directed to demand of France 

*' Whether, if Grcat-Tlr'tain revoked her hlockades of a date anterior to the 
decree commonly caili-d liie Berlin decree, his majesty the emperor would consent 
to revoke that decree ?" 

To which the emperor, falling into the views of our 
government, and foreseeing the snare which would be laid 
for Great-Britain, inasmuch as, if she consented to repeal 
said orders, it would be an admission that she had been the 
aggressor upon neutral commerce, and further, that it 
would be an admission that she had no right to exert her 
only force ^ her maritime power ^ for the coercion of her 
enemy, replied, 

"That the on"ly condition required for the revocation of the decree of Berlin, 
will be a pi'evious revocation by Great-Britain of her blockades of France or parts 
of France, of a date anterior to the aforesaid decree." 

So far the plot went on prosperously ; and if Great- 
Britain had fallen into the project, it would have been 
made the pretext for preventing any future blockades of 
even single ports of France in which armaments for her 
destruction or the destruction of her commerce should be 
formed, and she would have relinquished to an enemy, 
whom she cannot attack upon the continent upon equal 
terms, the only weapons which God and her own valor had 
placed within her power. 

Gen. Armstrong having so far succeeded, lost no time 
in transmitting to Mr. Pinkney i\\\:, project, the failure of 
which was not only certain, but was probably calculated 
upon by both the high intriguing parties. 



30 

Mr. Pinkncy on the 15th of February, 1810, demanded 
of Lord Wellcsley, in pursuance of the same project, 
whether Great Britain considered any, and if any, what 
blockades of the French coast of a date anterior to the Berlin 
decree in force ? He specified none in particular, except 
that of May, 1806. Indeed it appears by Lord Wellesley's 
note that no others existed. 

Lord Welleslcy replied, that the order of May, 1806, 
" was comprehended in the order of council of January, 
*' 1807, which was yet in force :" But did not intimate, 
nor was he ever asked, whedier Great-Britain would repeal 
diat order. 

Mr. Pinkney, on the 7th of March, 1810, asked a fur- 
ther explanation on the subject, whether the order of May^ 
1806, utis merged or sunk in that of January, 1807, and 
whether any other blockades of France, except that of 
May, 1806', still existed? 

Lord Welleslcy replied to this second inquiry of Mr. 
Pinkney, " That the order of May, 1806, had never been 
formally withdrawn, though it was comprehended under 
the more extensive orders of January, 1807." He declar- 
ed, however, that no other blockade of the ports of France 
existed ^ntQvioY to January, 1807. 

As he had never been required to answer, he was silent 
on the question, whether the order of May, 1806, would be 
withdrawn. 

Mr. Pinkney, though not perfectly satisfied with Lord 
Wellesley's answer, still deemed it sufficient if France was 
sincere, and accordingly wrote to Gen. Armstrong on the 
6th of April, "That the inference from Lord Wellesley's 
statement is that the blockade of May, 1806, is virtually at 
an end, being merged and comprehended in an order of 
council issued after the date of the Berlin decree." 

Such was Mr. Pinkney's construction of Lord Welles- 
ley's letter ; but this did not suit either the views of France, 
Gen. Armstrong, or of our cabinet. No cause of quarrel, 
no mode of renewing the commercial warfare against Great 
Britain resulted from such a natural and fair construction 
of Lord Wellesley's note. It was decided in the cabinet 
of Paris to compel Great Britain to make ^formal renun- 



31 

elation of her rights, and if she had consented to such an 
humiUation, the emperor reserved to himself, in the vague 
and inexplicit terms of his requisition, an ample latitude 
to demand still further humiliations. Accordingly Gen. 
Armstrong wrote to Mr. Smith with respect to Lord 
Wellesley's statement, on the 3d of May, that "he need 
scarcely observe how impossible it is to make this or any 
similar statement the ground work of a new demand for a 
repeal of the Berlin decree." 

And it seems that in pursuance of this opinion he has 
abstained from that day to the present to inform his majesty 
of the construction put upon the orders of May, 1S06, 
and January, 1807, by the British cabinet, which our other 
minister at London, Mr. Pinkney, thouglit and had com- 
municated to him such an opinion amounted to a virtual 
repeal of the former. 

Thus we see how faithfully our two ministers conducted 
this negotiation. 

Gen. Armstrong informs Mr. Pinkney that if Great- 
Britain will repeal her orders anterior to the Berlin decree, 
that France will repeal her decrees, 

Mr. Pinkney simply asks Lord Wellesley if those anterior 
orders are still in force. Nor did he ask whether Great- 
Britain would revoke them until long after the answer of 
Great-Britain to the first question, whether they were iii- 
force, had been transmitted to France. 

When the answer of the British cabinet is such as leads 
Mr. Pinkney to think them virtually at an end, and when 
he communicates this result to Gen. Armstrong, he does 
not think it worthy of attention, nor sufficient to disturb the 
repose of his imperial maJKjsty, by submitting the question 
to him ! 

It is now perceived, we presume, by every intelligent 
reader, that the way was perfectly prepared in concert for 
the extraordinary letter of tlie Due de Cadore, in winch a 
formal but illusory promise of a repeal of the Berlin and 
Milan decrees is tendered, provided Great-Britain will repeal 
her orders, and renounce, not the blockade of Alaij, 1806, 
which she had declared was the only one in force, not all 
onierior blockades actually existing;', but something further, 



32 

something inadmissible, that she shall renounce " lier 
principles of blockade which she wishes to establish. ''' 

Terms which every man will j^crceive might be con- 
strued to amount to the surrender of all her maritime rights. 

We conceive then that we ha\e established our ftrst pro- 
position, that this demand upon Great Britain to renounce 
her principles of blockade proceeded from our cabinet — 
was a concerted scheme, and was not pressed as an ultima- 
tum until it was well ascertained that it xvoulcl not and could 
not be yielded. 

Our second proposition rests on simpler, and if possible 
on still more conclusive grounds — upon authority which 
Mr. Madison will not deny, because it is Ids own. 

We say, ^nclly^ That Mr. Madison when he demanded 
of Great Britain as a condition of issuing his proclamation 
that she should annul her decree of May, 1806, kncxv that 
he was not authorized to annex such a condition. 

That he did annex such a condition is proved by a letter 
from our secretary of state, of July 5th, 1810, to Mr. Pink- 
ney, in which he says, " You will accordingly let it be dis- 
tinctly understood that it must necessarily include the anul- 
ment of the blockade of May, 1806." 

Now the right of Mr. Madison to include this demand as 
an indispensable con-dition could only arise from the con- 
struction put by him on the act of Congress of May, 1810, 
which authorized him, in case " either of the belligerents 
should so far revoke or modify its decrees or edicts as that 
they ceased to violate the neutral commerce of the United 
States," to issue his proclamation stating that fact, and upon 
such proclamation, so made, the non-intercourse wasto re- 
vive against the other belligerent, if he should Hul to repeal 
*' his edicts in like manner within three months." 

It is not denied that the decrees or edicts which did^^icv 
late our neutral commerce were undefined by the act. 
Mr. Madison, by his agent Mr. Gallatin, has incautiously 
admitted this uncertainty. — It is not denied that INIr. Mad- 
ison, in the execution of this power, was the sole judge of 
the decrees to which it extended. It is a little unlucky, 
however, when the statute was so undefined as he now 
complains^ that Mr. Madison should have extended it to 



33 

^n old and harmless blockade of Great Britain, and should 
have passed over the Rambouillet and Bayonne decrees of 
France ! 

But our main question still returns — did in fact Mr. Mad- 
ison believe that the act of May, 1810, extended to the 
British blockade of May, 1806, so as to have a right to say 
that the renunciation or repeal of Great Britain must neces- 
sarily include that blockade ? 

We say that he did 7iot believe it, though he said it in a 
solemn manner, and we prove it thus : — • 

On the 1st day of March, 1809, Congress passed an act 
prohibiting intercourse both with Great Britain and France. 
That act provided however that, " in case either of the 
belligerents should so repeal or modify its edicts as that 
they should cease to violate the neutral commerce of the 
United States, the president should certify that fact by 
proclamation," and the trade should be open with such 
power. 

It will be seen that the words are verbatim et literatim 
the same as in the act of May, 1810, which Mr. Madison 
has declared necessa^'ily included the blockade of May, 
1806. Yet on the 19th of April, 1809, three years nearly 
after the blockade of Ma}^ 1806, Mr. Madison made a 
convention \vith Mr. Erskine, the British minister, and 
thereupon issued his proclamation of that date, declaring 
that 

" Whereas Great Britain had by its minister assured him that the Orders in Coun- 
cil of JanHary and November, ISO", f only J will have been repealed, on the lOtli 
day of June next, lie certified that fact, and that the trade with Great Britain should 
after that day be free to the citizens of tiie United States." 

Now as the words of both statutes are precisely the same, 
as his powers to make such a proclamation are wholly found- 
ed on the acts of Congress, as all the acts of Great Britain, 
now demanded to be repealed, existed prior to his procla- 
mation of April, 1809, it follows, that he did not believe, at 
least in April, 1809, that the blockade of Great- Britain of 
Mav, 1806, was a '-'violation of our neutral commerce, ■[ 
because he did not demand its repeal. 



34 

That there wag a secret understandhig between our 
cabinet and th'it of France, that Great Britain should be 
required to annul her blockades of a date anterior to the 
Berlin decree, and that this suggestion first came from our 
cabinet, will appear from the two following extracts of let^ 
ters from our Secretary Smith to Mr. Pinkney, and one is 
dated July 5th, 1810, in which he says, " You will let it 
be distinctly understood that the repeal must neccssaribj in- 
c/i^fl^c" an annulment of the blockade of May, 1806 — This is 
the explanation which ruill be given by our minister at Paris 
to the French government, in case it shall there be required." 
It seems it had 7iot then been required by France. 

That this was a concerted thing, is apparent from another 
clause of the same letter, in which Mr. Smith says, that 
" should Great Britain not withdraw all he?' previous partial 
blockades, it is probable that France will draw Great Bri- 
tain and the United States to issue on the legality of such 
blockades, (that is, all partial blockades,) by acceding to 
the act of Congress on condition that the repeal of the block- 
ade shall accompamj that of the orders in council." 

Within one month after these despatches arrived in 
France, Bonaparte did bring us to issue with Great Britain 
on this very point, and yet Mr. Madison was no prophet, 
because it was he who first suggested the thought to Arm- 
strono:^ and Armstrong to the ingenious Cabinet of St, 
Cloud. 

In support of this assertion, I adduce the following ex- 
tract of a letter from Gen. Armstrong to oz/?* Secretary, 
dated long before, viz. Jan. 23d, 1810. " In conformity 
to your suggestions in your letter of Dec. 1st, 1809, I de- 
manded whether if Great Britain revoked her decrees of a 
date anterior to the Berlin decree, his Majesty would con- 
sent to revoke that decree." 

It is much to be doubted whether France would have 
ever thought of such a condition had it not been thus sug- 
gested by our own Cabinet. 

These then are Mr. Madison's proofs of his fair offers to 
Great Britain to induce her to repeal her orders in council. 
It appears that it was impossible for Great Britain to com- 



35 

ply with either of these offers without sacrinciiig her most 
important rights, and that our cabinet have studiously 
poupled with the obnoxious decrees such further demands 
as it was known Great Britain could not yield. 

Before I quit the subject of the orders in council, I shall 
notice a popular objection to them, which is well calculat- 
ed to rouse the jealousy of commercial men — and that is, 
that Great Britain relaxes them in favor of her own sub- 
jects, and enjoys that very trade from which she excludes 
neutrals. One' might saygenerally that if the blockade was 
originally lawful as a retaliation on her enemy, no partial 
relaxation m favor of the besieger, and which she thinks 
will enable her longer to carry on the ^var, or sooner reduce 
the enemy, could render the JDloekade illegal as to neutrals — 
nor if the blockade was at first unjust, could this render it 
more so. One thing also all men will concede, that this 
partial relaxation does not proceed from a willingness to 
relieve France, but from a belief whether mistaken or not, 
that Britain has the advantage in the interchange. 

Thus, she lets the French have small quantities of coffee 
and sugar which she does not want, and has taken in return, 
flour which is necessary to her. Now if by this partial 
exchange she strengdiens herself, and is enabled more ef- 
fectually to cramp the commerce of her eneni}^, surely the 
blockade does not for that cause cease to be legal. Let us 
apply general admitted principles and known cases to this 
objection. Enemies when they find it convenient, ex- 
change prisonei's, and send back to each other the men nec- 
essay to carry on the war. Can a neutral complain of this, 
or insist from this relaxation for their mutual interests, that 
he has a right to supply them with men ? 

In the French war with Russia, under Paul first, they 
clothed and sent bade a \vhole Russian army ^vilich they 
had taken, and that without exchange. 

Could America have complained of this, and have in- 
sisted upon furnishing Russia with military clothing and 
men ? Yet the principle is perfectly analogous. 

Suppose Soult, who is besieging Cadiz was able to in- 
vest it by sea as well as land, and supj^ose he should pro- 
pose to the Spaniards to supply them with water which the 



c? 



6 



city wants, provided they would furnish him with bread 
for the want of which his soldiers are famishing, could 
Ameriaa complain of this, and insist upon her right to vio- 
late the blockade and to supply Cadiz with flour ? Or sup- 
pose instead of flour, he should stipulate to receive back 
gold to pay his troops with, would this vary the question ? 
Certainly not — an hundred analogous cases may be put, but 
the general proposition and argument is unanswerable. If the 
belUgerent had an original right to attempt to reduce an ene- 
my by seige, or blockade,orby retaliating upon him a system 
of commercial distress, any partial relaxation in the rigour 
of the execution of such siege or retaliation to the benefit 
of such belligerent as he believes, and to the injury or hu- 
miliation of the enemy cannot affect the question of right. 
If therefore France, the haughty France, which threatens 
Britain with the destruction of her commerce, condescends 
to beg and to receive bales of British broadcloth to clothe 
her troops, this not only strengthens Britain and enables 
her to persevere in distressing her enemy, but it humbles 
that enemy in the sight of the world. Such are the ideas 
which this relaxation suggests. 

I now proceed to consider my second proposition, the 
expediency of the proposed war, both upon the supposition 
of a successful and unsuccessful issue. 

I need not spend time to shew, that the rulers of a free 
3tate, intrusted with temporary power for the public good, 
have no right to embark in a war even if it be just, unless 
there should be at least a reasonable prospect of attaining 
the object of the war by arms — unless the evils proposed 
to be redressed, will in all human probability be remedied* 
by the war. Individual tyrants can, to be sure, though not 
lawfully, rush into war and plunge their subjects into the 
deepest distress, to gratify their ambition, or to satiate 
their revenge. But the wise rulers of a free people will 
iicver encounter certain evils for doubtful good, much less 
in a desperate cause. 

Great Britain stands in a situation which may be called 
unexampled. Her marine power is greater than that oi 
any other nation since we have any authentic histories o 
civilized society. Opposed to her is the gigantic domin- 



37 

ion of France, enjoyed and swayed by one of die most am- 
bidous, daring, successful and unprincipled men whom the 
world has produced — a man, who has shewn that he nei- 
ther respects the venerable institutions of religion, nor the 
fluth of treaties, nor the established laws of civilized na- 
tions — a declared enemy to the ancient dynasties of mon- 
archical states, as well as to the humble citizens of free 
republics — He has spared no people whom his arms could 
subdue, and there arc none whom he has subdued that he 
has not reduced to the lowest stage of servitude and mis- 
ery. 

Against this monstrous power Great Britain by means 
of her marine force, has been alone enabled to make a suc- 
cessful stand, and it is immaterial to us, whether this op- 
position on her part proceeds from a general regard to the 
interests of all free and independent states, or whether she 
is influenced by her own interests or by her ambition — ■ 
The effect upon us is the same, and we have only to ask 
ourselves whether we have most to apprehend from the ab- 
solute success of the arms of France, or from tbe mere ca- 
pacity of Great Britain to resist the tyrant who threatens 
her with destruction^-\i the chances between these two 
combatants were equal — if it was as probable that Great 
Britain would subdue France, as that France will subdue 
Great Britain, then we should only have to ask ourselves 
which would be most likely to abuse their power, and we 
ought in that case to wish success to that nation which 
had manifested the greatest disposition to justice and mod- 
eration. 

All men who value the protestant religion — all men who 
love freedom, and all impartial men acquainted with the 
moral character and political conduct of the two govern- 
ments, must admit, that it would be safer for a free and 
protestant state to ha\ e the power in the hands of Great 
Britain than in that of France. — Britain is ruled by her cit^ 
izens — she is essentially free, and no nation abhors more 
than slie does the tyrannical principles which actuate the 
ruler of France. 

Our interest then in the strongest case vrhich could be 



38 

put would be in favor of the predominaiKC of British 
power rather than that of France. 

But the case I have put I may say is not only an impro- 
bable but humanly sj^eaking an impossible one — While 
Bonaparte every day boasts both of his power and intention 
to humble, reduce and destroy Great Britain, while he says 
that " she will one day become as insignificant as Sardi- 
nia" the most extravagant Englishman never ventures to 
hope any thing more than the reduction of France to the 
power she possessed under the dynasty of the Bourbons — 
and this we may add is a more improbable supposition than 
even the extermination of Great Britain, distant as we 
ought to hope (notwithstanding she is our enemy) that 
event may be. 

Let us suppose then that our arms imited to those of 
France should be completely successful, (and it is to be 
presumed that our president undertakes tliis war with the 
7iope ^nd expectation of success,) suppose Great Britain 
humbled and compelled to yield up her maritime superior- 
ity, what security have we that France will exercise the 
advantage which she shall have gained by our united efforts 
and sacrifices with more moderation and justice, more re- 
gard to the laws and common interest of nations than Bri- 
tain has done ? Shall we find reasonable grounds for such 
a hope in her treatment of all neutral states to which her 
arms have extended ? Shall we find it in her code of colo- 
nial law, in the restrictions which in all past ages and at the 
present moment she imposes on all commerce with her 
possessions ? Shall we find it in the new practices which 
she has adopted of converting every captain of her fleet 
into an admiralty judge, and authorizing him to burn, 
sink and destroy upon a quarter deck trial and adjudica- 
tion ? 

But suppose Britain humbled, and the fleets of France 
«nce triumphant on the ocean, lu^'C wc any security that 
she will not enforce her pretentions to Nova Scotia and 
Canada, and Louisiana, and the Antilles, and South Amer- 
ica and the Floridas ? Many of them once the jewels of 
her crown, and all of tliem the avowed abjects of her am^ 
bitj^n ? 



39 

If these countries are once subdued by her, what rigl^t 
have we to expect that she will not apply to them tlie 
principles which she has always maintained of excluding 
foreigners from a participation in their trade ? 

What right have we to expect that she will favor or 
cven permit our intercourse with any of the European 
states under her control ? 

But above all, what right have we to hope that she will 
not look with a jealous eye on the only remaining repub- 
lic ? That she will endure the example set to her own 
subjects by the citizens of this country who boast the right 
of governing themselves ? 

Why should we expect to be exempt from the effects of 
her lawless ambhion ? We, a nation hateful to her on ac- 
count of our origin, our language, our manners, our free 
institutions, our religion ? Where is the bold statesman 
who will aflirm that she will not undertake the conquest of 
this country, or who, considering her military power, and 
talents, and our own divided and feeble state will guarantee 
that she will fail in her attempts upon our liberties '? 

I could press these considerations much farther, but the 
thought of them is too dreadful, and the danger m the 
event of the destruction of Great Britain too imminent to 
require any further developement. 

But suppose instead of the destruction of Great Britain 
we should only succeed in imposing upon her a reluctant 
assent to our demands — Suppose we make a separate peace, 
and she should withdraw her orders in council, and should 
agree to give up the right of reclaiming her own subjects 
and the doctrine of blockade '? What would be our condi- 
tion ? We should have expended perhaps 100 millions of 
dollars — We should have impoverished our merchants and 
mechanics, and farmers — We should have lost all tl e pro- 
fits of our neutrality during the war, and in exchange for 
this we should have gained the trade to France — a trade 
subject to the vex'^.tions, the tributes and embarrassments, 
which a military sovereign despising commerce will always 
inflict. 

But if the British maritime power should still be unbrok- 
en, as in this case 1 havQ supposed, what security should we 



1 



40 

have, that as soon as she had recruited from our blows, she 
would not again resort to the same measures which she 
deems necessary to her existence ? 

So that we should have the satisfaction of having fought 
and ruined ourselves for a principle which w^as not worth 
the contest, and which, when yielded from necessity would 
be resumed as soon as the power of our enemy would 
permit. 

I have already put what I consider the two most impro- 
bable cases. Let us now view our situation in case we 
should fliil in our object — In order that we may judge of 
the probability of success, let us consider the nature of this 
contest. Great Britain except in Canada and Nova Scotia 
is as invulnerable to us as she is to France. Bonaparte at 
his accession to the throne of France declared to all Europe 
his fixed determination to restore the marine of France — 
He has had at his command the resources of sixty millions 
of people — He possesses above 100 ships of the line, 200 
frigates and 100 smaller vessels of war— Yet he has made 
no sensible advances towards maintaining an equal contest 
wi h Great Britain — On the contrary his march may be said 
to be retrograde, and yet he has had twelve years of experi- 
ment in his project — Is it then probable, that seven millions 
of people scattered as the citizens of the United States are, 
and a gi-eat proportion of w horn are averse and hostile to 
naval equipments, whose whole navy consists of some half 
a score of small ships, can bring any essential aid to France 
in this war against the British marine ? 

It is said however that we can distress her trade by our 
privateers — That some individual 'osses may be sustained 
by her subjects is not denied ; but it will also not be denied 
that our losses and her gains from us will be more than an 
hundred times as great. Is this the w^ay to reduce a great* 
and powerful nation to our terms ? 

But it is said we shall take Canada and Nova Scotia — 
This perhaps may be eftected with much bloodshed, and 
greater expenditure than the whole fee simple of those bai'- 
ren provinces would produce — Will this impoverish Great 
Britain ? No — It will strengthen her — Those provinces 
are an annual charge upon her revenue — Will they strength- 



41 

en us ? No — They will enfeeble us — They will increase 
the jarring materials of which the United States are compos- 
ed, and which are already too discordant for our peace or 
safety — They will open an easy entrance to French power 
and French intrigues — Already Frenchmen are admitted 
to a seat in our national coimcils, and the addition of Cana- 
da would only give to France the opportimity of attacking 
us on both flanks ; for it ought to be known that every 
Louisianian and Canadian is at heart as well as by habits a 
Frenchman. 

But if xve weaken Great Britain by assaults upon her 
provinces and commerce, has she no means of annoying us 
in as great and vital a degree ? Ask the underwriters. 
Ask the Nantucket owners of whalemen. Ask the mer- 
chants who h?.\e hazarded millions beyond the Cape of 
Good Hope. See the citizens of Nantucket fleeing from 
their habitations and sending the specie of their banks to 
Boston for safe keeping. Ask the fishermen of Marble- 
head how many fares they will get during the war. Above 
all, ask the inhabitants of the province of Maine what will 
become of their navigation and their lumber ? 

No country ever rushed into a war so obviously and un- 
deniably ruinous for the sake of maintaining doubtful prin- 
ciples of small value, and which were so little likely to be 
obtained by it. 

But if we attack the provinces of Great Britain, have we 
any security th it Great Britain will not annoy or annihilate 
our cities ? This would be a dreadful sort of warfare, (say 
some persons) to which Great Britain \vould not resort. 

This is a strange sort of reasoning — We force her reluc- 
tandy into a war — We plimder her commerce — We wrest 
from her her peaceful provinces, but we expect tjiat she 
will forbear from doing to us all the injury in her power. 
Her forbearance must then be much greater than her calum- 
niators in this country have declared. 

In a contest between two nations, the question, which 
will be the most likely to yield, depends upon the compar- 
ison of their opulence and population, their military force, 
their capacity to endure sufferings, their respective habi- 
tudes as to war, the amount of the relati^•c losses which they 
6 



42 

may respectively sustain, and the firmness and strength of 
their political institutions — Every man must admit this to 
be a fair view of the case. Now in each of these points 
Great Britain will have the advantage of us. Great Britain 
has twice our population and at least four times our opu- 
lence — She has fifty times our land force, and above one 
hundred times our naval force — She has a much greater 
capacity to endure sufferings and losses from the above 
causes — She has been inured to war for several centuries, 
and the addition of the United States to the number of her 
enemies will not produce so much eifect upon her as did 
our embargo, which we found by experience was very small 
—In short we have been her enemy iny^cf and in intention 
ever since December, 1807, when Congress laid the em- 
bargo to distress her trade and to please France. As to the 
relative amount of losses which the two countries will sus- 
tain, we would ask whether the British trade, protected as 
it will be by strong convoys, can possibly suffer as much 
from our twenty ships of war and a few privateers, as we 
shall sustain in our ships without convoy, and exposed to 
six hundred ships of war of Great Britain ? 

Lastly, can it be believed that a monarchical and aristo- 
cratical government like that of Great Britain will not be 
better able to stand the shock of another war, than the fee- 
ble, divided, changeable, and changing rulers of our nation ? 
a nation which goes to war w ith two thirds of all the rep- 
resentatives and senators of the Northern States against it. 
Even a British minister would not hazard a war (supported 
as he is by 600,000 men in arms) with a majority in the 
house of Lords of only six members. What madness then 
must it be deemed in our government of opinion only^ to 
hazard an offensive and ruinous war by the same small ma- 
jority ? 

There are those however among the most ignorant of the 
people who derive some consolation, or rather found their 
hopes of success on the issue of our last contest with Great 
Britain. Such men make a wretched figure at estimating 
and comparing distant and dissimilar political events. 

Great Britain was then the assailant — She transported 
her troops 3000 miles to conquer, not to defend. A nation 



43 

acting upon the defensive has an hundred fold (or perhaps 
even more than that) the advantage over the nation which 
invades especially from a great distance. The difficulty of 
supply to its forces, and their consequent limited operations, 
retard the progress of the invading power. 

Our nation was in the former war not only united but 
enthusiastic — They fought pro aris etfocis, for their lives 
and liberties. We are certainly not united in the prose- 
cution of this war, and so far from enthusiasm in any de- 
scription of people, the war is secretly condemned by the 
mass of one party, and openly execrated by the other. fVe^ 
instead of defending our own soil, ai'e mw inflated with the 
ambition of conquest, — we are about to march to add new 
territories to our overgrown republic at both extremities 
of our country — we say to the North, and to the South, to 
provinces and to people who have never offended us, and 
who do not ask our aid, " Yield yourselves up as subjects 
to the victorious arms of America." 

But we should recollect that the war of the revolution, so 
far as it affords us a precedent of our powder when we turn 
ourselves into invaders, offers us no flattering prospect, — 
The invasion of Canada by Arnold and Montgomery, and 
the unfortunate expedition to Bigwaduce or Penobscot, 
do not redound to our honor in the pages of our histoiy. 

Upon the ocean how much less reason have wo. to com- 
pare the two cases together ? France could then on that 
element scarcely be said to be inferior to Britain. D'Es- 
taing often rode master of our coasts. Keppel was drt/en 
into port, and the British channel ( emphaticolbj so colled 
at this day,) acknowledged for one moment France as its 
master. The combined naval forces of France, Spain ind 
Holland in the latter years of the war were decidedly an 
overmatch for the British. Yet even with \\<\% fearful lif- 
fercnce between her power then and now^, we atchievcd no- 
thing against her commerce after the four first years of hat 
war. Towards the close of the war she picked even the 
. pinfeathers from the plumage of those who had rioted on 
the plunder of her commerce, and scarcely an American pri- 
vateer or ship of w^ar dared to display its flag upon the oc-an. 



44 

We now take up the third point which I proposed to 
discuss, that if the administration had deliberately resolved 
upon war, it was their solemn duty to have made prepara- 
tions to defend our commerce on the ocean, to have en- 
couraged by every facility the restoration or return of the 
millions of the property of our citizens now in the British 
dominions and power, and also to have warned our citizens 
of their danger, instead of keeping their hostile purpose se- 
cret, and letting these measures fall with the rapidity of 
lightning upon our unprotected commerce. 

If the purpose of the Government had been long fixed, 
and surely no new irritations on the part of Great Britain 
have taken place within the last year, they ought so to have 
managed their preparations for war as not only to have 
given ample notice to our merchants, but to have satisfied 
Great Britain, that they were resolved to resort to the last 
extremity, in order that it might have been seen what would 
be the effect of such a resolution on the councils of her 
Cabinet. So far was the conduct of Great Britain within 
the past year from authorizing our citizens to expect a re- 
sort to so dreadful a remedy on the part of our Govern- 
ment, that it led them to hope, that some expedient would 
be devised by our Cabinet to avert the calamities with 
which we were threatened, and the evils which we actually 
suffered. The nomination of a new minister to this coun- 
tr]^ after the cold and affrontive dismission of Mr. Jackson, 
together with the satisfactory settlement of the affair of the 
Chesapeake, gave us reasonable ground to believe, that the 
Government could not contemplate an open, undisguised, 
sudden, and offensive war. 

For what step could have been more calculated to lull our 
commercial friends into fatal security than the acceptance of 
the tendered atonement for the attack on the Chesapeake ? 
What motive could there be for adjusting that affair if oqr 
cabinet then intended a resort to arms ? 

But there were still stronger reasons for believing that 
the Cabinet of this country would not rush into the embra- 
ces of France, and join her in her efforts against Great Brit- 
ain. Within the past year, we had sent a new ambassador 
to Paris, and in lieu of an explicit abandonment of her de- 



45 

crees, in place of an immediate restoration of our property 
unjustly surprized by France, and which the President had 
declared must be an indispensable coiidition of our return 
to I'riendly relations with her, we hiid seen that France had 
anew promulgated her decrees as the fundamental laws of 
her empire, — that instead of restoring our property, our 
minister had declared that he had made no progress in ob- 
taining redress upon that point, and that the prospect of 
success was both distant and doubtful. 

On the other har.d, France had recently gi^•en new and 
abundant proofs of her determination to annihilate all free 
and neutral commerce by tl.ie indiscriminate plunder and 
destruction of all our ships which she encountered on the 
high seas. 

In this state of things it was impossible for any honest 
and honorable man to presume, that we should suddenly 
join France in her war against Great Britain. If howe\er 
the Cabinet deemed it for our interest to enter into so 
unnatural a coalition, it was their solemn duty to have in- 
creased our marine so as to protect in some degree our 
trade on our own coasts. 

Let it not be said in ans^vcr to this, that the attempt 
would have been fruitless, for the attempt is now made, 
and our feeble but gallant navy ordered out to guard our 
coasts or become victims to the superior force of the enemy. 

Either then the defence of our coast and waters ought to 
have been avowedly abandoned, or more effectual measures 
should have been taken to render this defence of some avail. 

The course adopted is only calculated to sacrifice, after a 
short time, the truly gallant officers of our little navy, and to 
afford a feeble and illusory protection to our commerce. 

Our merchants in pursuance of their national rights 
and interests had purchased great quantities of British 
goods, and by the course of trade, and from the superior 
convenience and security arising from the good credit 
of the British merchants, had deposited immense sums in 
Great Britain. If it had been, which it now appears that 
it was, the determination of the cabinet to resort to offen- 
sive war, they ought most certainly to have repealed the re- 
st:rictions on the importation of British goods, and to have 



46 

permitted our citizens to bring back their property in order 
to enable them to pay their taxes, and to support the bur- 
then of the war. It is the first instance, we believe, in which 
a nation ever commenced a war by giving up to the enemy 
such an immense proportion of its own property and means 
of annoyance. If we were disposed to jealousy, we might 
say, that this has the appearance of playing into the hands 
of our enemy, of gratifying the desire of France to humble 
and reduce all free states, and sacrificing the commercial 
interests of this section of our country to the passions of 
tlie rash and unthinking representatives of the south. 

Whatever may have been the motive, the effect has been 
most dreadful. The people of New-England generally had 
not the smallest apprehension of such a result. — They are 
wholly unprepared. When the embargo was imposed, they 
hurried away their property as they lawfully might in order 
to escape the vengeance of their own Government, and they 
entrusted it principally with the very nation which the cab- 
inet tell us must be our enemy. 

If war therefore had really been intended at the beginning 
of the session, which we are now assured that it was, the 
duty of a watchful and paternal government was, to have 
continued that embargo, and to have abstained from hostil- 
ities until the property thus sent into the very jaws of the 
proposed enemy, could have been restored to an impo^Tr- 
ished country, which will hereafter need all its resources. 

Fourthly, in a war offensive and unjust, the citizens are 
not only not obliged to take part, but by the laws of God, 
and of civil society, they are bound to abstain. 

This may appear to some an abstract proposition, true 
perhaps in itself, but in practice of no moment, since the 
citizen can be compelled to take his share of the burdens 
of the war by the superior power of his sovereign. But in 
a free government like ours, it is no answer for rulers to say 
to the people, we have a military force, and we can and 
will compel you to do what we direct, be it lawful or un- 
lawful. The citizen ought to know what the ruler can 
rightfully do ; as to his remedy in case he should do wrong 
that I will endeavour to shew hereafter. 



47 

The importance of a few remarks on this question of right 
will be perceived from this consideration, that our privilege 
of discussion and of assembling to consider this interesting 
topic of war depends on the right of the citizen to judge 
in the last resort of the justice of the proposed war. If a 
government can lawfully plunge the people into an unjust, 
offensive war, and if they are as much bound to support such 
a war as Sijust and defensive one, then the discussion of its 
justice would be nugatory, and indeed injurious, and the 
government might very fairly suppress all examination into 
its merits. 

But the law of nature and nations declares, that in a des- 
potic or free government, the subject is not bound to obey 
the imlaxvful commands of his prince or rulers — So even at 
common law, a slave cannot excuse himself by the com- 
mands of his master for committing murder, robbery or any 
other crime. If Gen. Dearborn should for example by order 
of the president seize upon Gov. Strong and his honorable 
council, and attempt to transport them to Washington, they 
could have a habeas corpus, and question the legality of 
such an order, and if found illegal, Gen. Dearborn would be 
punished as certainly as if he had acted -without any orders — 
These are analogous cases — We shall now cite the highest 
authority that we know of on the law of nations relative to the 
right of the subject to judge of the lawfidness of a war, and 
to refuse his aid in its support. 

Grotius, book II. chap. xxvi. considers this question 
distinctly — He says, that " those who are in a more servile 
" condition, such as sons of a family, servants, subjects, 
*' and each particular citize?!, compared with the whole 
'* body of the city whereof they are members, if they arc 
" admitted to advise, or left to their own choice, whether they 
*' will take up arms, or be quiet, ought to be guided by 
" the same rules which are already set down for those 
" who, being free, have power to make war for themselves 
*'or others. But if commanded thereunto, as usually they 
*' are, then if it be evident to them that the cause be trnjust, 
*' they ought altogether to forbear, for that God is rather 
" to be obeyed than jnan. To justify subjects for refusing 
" to execute the wicked commands of. their princes, ^v(' 



48 

" have several examples in sacred ston*. '^ "We conclude,' ' 
he says, " that where the subject doth not only doubt the 
*' lawfulness of the war, but is by very probable arguments 
*' induced to believe it unjust, especially if that war be ojfcm- 
*' she and not defensive, he is bound to abstain." Again he 
adds, in book III. chap. x. "That the ground of a war 
•' being unjust (although it be solemnly undertaken as to the 
" manner,) yet are all those acts that are done in it unjust, so 
*' that they that shall knowingly' commit such acts, or assist 
" in the doing of them are included in the number of those 
" who, without repentance, cannot entc into the kingdom 
" of heaven." 

We now shall consider, lastly, what are the peaceable and 
constitutional remedies in the hands of the people to put a 
stop to an unjust, offensive, and ruinous vrar. These reme- 
dies are of various sorts — they are such as belong and may 
be used by each individual separately, or they may be exer- 
cised by the people collectively — Individually, every man 
has a right to express his disapprobation, and (if he feels so 
strongly) his execration of the war, and of the causes which 
led to it, as well as his horror of the consequences with which 
it is pregnant — he may do this in conversation or in writing 
and print, he may circulate these opinions as widely and as 
extensively as maybe in his power; he may encourage others 
to do the same, and ma}- endeavour to gain as many prose- 
lytes to his opinion as he possibly can. He may point out to 
public censure and contempt the men from this state who 
deserted the interests of commerce and joined the standard 
of its enemies, without whose cooperation this deadly measure 
would never have been adopted. All these things he may 
do without being amenable to the laws, in all these things he 
is expressly protected by the constitution — there is but one 
limitation to this power — he must confine himself strictly 
to truth in stating his facts, but in his reasoning and infer- 
ences he may take what latitude he pleases. The individual 
has two other rights on this subject — he may assemble and 
associate with others to effect a peaceable repeal of the 
declaration of war, and for the purpose of procuring peace ; 
and he may vote for such men as will in Congress refuse 
to aid in the further prosecution of this ruinous ^var. 



49 ^ 

I might add to this statement of the powers and rights of 
the individual, that ^\ hen called into service contrary to the 
constitution and without legal authority, or when called to 
aid in executing any measures which arc a violation of the 
rights and liberties of the subject, he may refuse to act — he 
has a constitutional right to judge, and if he takes care that 
he is correct in his conduct, he will be protected in his refu- 
sal by the civil authority. 

The individual has also a right, and indeed it is laudable, 
to associate with others for the preservation of order and 
quiet, an4 to execute or assist in executijig the laws. A city, 
town or'tounty is disgraced which permits a lawless banditti, 
as lately at Baltimore, to triumph over the prostrate laws — It 
is the worst tyranny which can happen — In all other grie- 
vances you have redress against the aggressors, but in a mob 
it is almost impossible to discover and detect the culprits. 
Tliere is no remedy but a preventive one, and there 
should be an association well prepared to assist the peace 
officers in suppressing and bringing to condign punishment 
all disturbers of the peace. 

This is very important when the measures of government 
multiply the number of idlers, and tend to ruin the morals 
and habits of the people. — Such is commonly the efiect of 
all wars — such will particularly be the case in ours, which is a 
a war not of action, but of suftering ; not of glory, but of 
privation ; not in our own cause, but in that of France. 

The people collectively have a right to meet in their re- 
spective towns as bodies politic, then and there to express 
their opinions of the nature and tendency of the present 
war — to point out its destructive effects on themselves as 
^^'ell as the nation — to send, if need be, delegates to any 
county or state conventions which may be assembled for 
the same peaceable, orderly and constitutional purposes — 
They may instruct or advise their representatives and sen- 
ators how to act in this trying emergency — especially they 
may, if they see fit, earnestly recommend to the senators of 
this state to concur cither in a general ticket for the choice 
of electors of President, or in a choice of them by joint 
ballot. They must recollect that on the change of Presi- 
dent depends the prospect of pence, and every man, let his 
7 



50 

paiitics be what they may, who is attached to peace, must 
wish to disphicc the man xvha alone is responsible for this 
xvar — I mean Mr. Madison. 

The people in their town meetings would do well to pro- 
vide for the preservation of order. Privotecrsmen, recruits 
and beggars will swarm in our streets, idleness ^vill beget, 
crimes, and too early and too vigorous measures cannot be 
taken to prevent our reputation from being sullied, and our 
domestic enjoyment from being in jeopardy. 

The Legislature of the State also may do much. They 
have already done a great deal towards the restoration of 
peace by the dissemination of the truth and of sound and 
con*ect opinions. It is their legitimate right to act in such 
times, and Mr. Madison himself in 1797 pointed them out 
as the constitutional organs to defend, protect and guard the 
rights and interests of the people in dangerous and trying 
times. 

I have now finished my proposed plan, and it only re- 
mains that I suggest a few general thoughts and inferences 
which the subject, the reasoning already exhibited, and the 
awful situation of our country, naturally occasion. 

If the facts above stated, and the argimients before urged, 
deserve any weight, and I feel a confidence that the people 
will think that they do, they suggest to the mind very pain- 
ful reflections — they serve to shew either a mistaken policy, 
or an improper bias, and undue partiality in the small ma- 
jority of our rulers who have plunged us into this calami- 
tous war. Tliere are some other detached facts tending to- 
impair our confidence in them, and to shew a preconceived 
determination to enter into the war on the side of France, 
which could not properly have been introduced in the 
main body of my argument, but which deserve the most 
weighty consideration. When the treaty made by Mr. 
Jay with Great Britain expired by its own limitation, (a 
treaty ratified by Washington, and under which our com- 
merce flourished in an unexampled degree,) a proposal was 
made to Mr. Monroe by Great Britain, to renew it at least 
during the existing war between Great Britain and France. 
This proposal was submitted to our Cabinet, ^^ ho instruct- 
ed their minister not to enta- into any permanent an*ange 



51 

ment with Great Britain. The correspondence between the 
British minister and Mr. Monroe will shew this fact as well as 
the character and disposition of the two cabinets at that peri- 
od — at a later moment our two cnvo}'s extraordinary con- 
chided a formal treaty with the government of Great i3ritain 
extremely favorable to our commerce, and which Mr. Mad- 
ison's two friends, Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinkney, declared 
"to be satisfactory, and to embrace all the subjects which they 
were directed to include." This treaty the President re- 
jected, not even daring to lay it before the Senate, lest they 
should advise him to ratify it. This measure was the more 
extraordinary, as both the negotiators retained the respect 
and confidence of administration, and are now members of 
the same Cabinet which rejected their own treaty. 

Here was a second proof of the disposition of Great Bri- 
tain to make a permanent settlement of differences with 
this country, and of our cabinet to avoid, and defeat such 
an arrangement. The third attempt to settle all differences 
was made by Mr. Jackson, who assured our cabinet that 
he was clothed with ample powers and instructions to set- 
tle every point of difference between the two countries, and 
offered to exchange his full credentials against similar ones 
to be given by our cabinet to any negotiator, on their part — 
As soon as this distinct proposition was made, fault was in- 
stantly found with some part of Mr. Jackson's language, 
but with what particular passage no two men in Congress, 
or out of it, are as yet agreed, and he was dismissed with 
as little ceremony and a disposition as hostile as that in 
which the declaration of war was made. Mr. Erskine made 
an offer of atonement for the affair of the Chesapeake, which 
was precisely in the same terms in which the satisfaction 
was accepted two years afterwards. Yet lest all dissentions 
should be buried between the two countries, an offensive 
clause was added to the letter of acceptance on our part, 
which so offended the British cabinet as to become one of 
the principal causes of the rejection of Erskine's arrange- 
ment. 

Here then in five years we have four distinct and prom- 
inent facts leading all to the same point, to prove a disin 
clination to settle with Great Britain. 



52 

Now let us consider some facts which shew a disposi- 
tion on the pai't of our cabinet to affront and injure her, and 
to please and gratify France. I shall say nothing of the 
President's proclamation, contrary to the law of nations, ex- 
cluding British ships of war from our waters after the affair 
of the Chesapeake, before ^txvy application for remedy to the 
sovereign, who instantly disavowed the conduct of his of- 
ficers and promised reparation — But I must notice the 
conduct of our cabinet after the Berlin and Milan decrees. 
Great Britain notified us in February, 1807, that she should 
retaliate those decrees, if, after due time, wc should not re- 
sist them — This notice on her part was certainly frank and 
honorable. The administration contented themselves with 
replying that France had declared they did not extend to 
us. This was not true — Mons. Decres, the Minister of 
Marine, in the absence of Talleyrand, did, to be sure, say, 
that as the United States were specially protected by treaty y 
the decrees could not be intended to operate on them, but 
he added expressly., that he had no authority to make any 
explanation in the absence of the regular minister for for- 
eign relations — In fact, the Emperor paid no regard to this 
explanation, but in July 1807, in the ease of the Horizon de- 
clared "that as he had made no exception in the terms of 
his decrees, so he should make none in their execution." 

In the same month, he caused to be seized in the neu- 
tral states of Tuscany, Naples, and Hamburg, immense 
amounts of American property under his Berlin decree — 
We took no measures fcr redress — we have taken no effec- 
tual ones for the restoration of that property to the present 
day. 

To suffer millions of our property to go into the coffers 
of the enemy of Great-Britain without a struggle, and 
scarcely a complaint, was a wrong done to her — was as 
great a wrong as if we had loaned to France an equal sum, 
jDrovided we had the means of redress, which we most cer- 
tainly had, at least such as we afteru-ards deemed effectual, 
to wit, non- intercourse with her. But in another light, it 
was a still greater wrong done to Great-Britain, because 
these goods were seized on account of their having been 
pi British growth ; thus presenting the monstrous and 



53 

novel doctrine, so injurious to all neutral states, that one 
?ientral shall not even trade with another neutral in the pro- 
duce of the enemy of France. 

Such was our boasted resistance to the French decrees ! '. 
But this was a trijlc. Bonaparte, not content with this, 
told us throuj^h Gen. Arnistront^ and Mons. Turreau, in 
the course of the same summer, that lie would have no 
neutrals. In the autumn of 1807, Dutch and French 
merchants wrote to their correspondents in this country 
that there would be an embargo in the United States in the 
ensuing winter. Gen. Armstrong, it is said, announced to 
several Americans that our government would lay an em- 
bargo — our dispatch ship arrived iVom France, and in three 
days an embargo was laid. That measure was in effect 
war upon Great Britain — it was avowed as such in Con- 
gress — it was justified as such by the friends of adminis- 
tration — it was said, that it would bring her to our feet in 
four jnonths : yet the British orders w^re not known in 
this country w^ien the embargo was adopted — Mr. Picker- 
ing, well known (and deser\ edly respected wherever he is 
known) the faithful, steady, able, resolute friend of your 
rights and interests, has declared in sundry public pieces, 
to which he has given his name, and has never been con- 
tradicted, that the British orders were not known in the 
Senate when the embargo passed — in foet, they were some 
time afterwards communicated by Mr. Jefferson "as a 
farther proof of the wisdom and prudence of the embargo. 
We have only to inquire then, for whose benefit was the 
embargo imposed ? and against whom was it aimed ? We 
have shewn that the thought of it originated in France — 
we say, moreover, that Bonaparte, in three public state pa- 
pers, approved of it, and praised us for laying it — we say 
that by his decree of Bayonne he undertook to enforce it — 
we add, that as soon as we dared to repeal it, he issued a 
decree confiscating all our ships and cargoes in France. 

On the other hand, no man can have forgotten the keen 
letter of Mr. Canning, in which he declared, that the cabinet 
of G re it-Britain perfectly understood that measure as in- 
tended exclusively against Great-Britain, and to further the 
views and projects of France. In short, no man wlio had 



54 

either ears or eyes, and who either heard the language, or 
read the speeches of our members of Congress, could doubt 
that the embargo was aimed exchisively against Great- 
Britain — and yet it was imposed, I beg the public to recol- 
lect, it was imposed before the British orders in council 
were known in this country, those orders which now figure 
in the fore ground of our picture of British wrongs. 

Can any man read this statement, which is solemnly 
true, and not perceive that we have really been in league 
with France, and virtually at war with Britain for five years 
past ? The only reason it was not before declared was be- 
cause the people had not been wrought up to the proper 
degree of irritation. The war will be carried on upon the 
same principles as the commercial restriction system has 
been, not to procure a redress of our grievances^ but to 
uphold the continental system of the emperor. For this 
purpose, the restriction on British goods will be kept on ; 
and a bill is proposed in Congress to prohibit the exporta- 
tion of our oxvn produce except in American bottoms, or 
in vessels of nations actually at war with Great- Britain. 
Why this provision ? American vessels cannot go without 
immense risk — why prohibit our exportation in any neutral 
vessels ? or in any vessels of nations not at xvar with us ? 
Pressed to the earth by our losses and our war-taxes, every 
vent for our productions must be very important. But it 
must not be — it is against the interest of France that you 
should supply Spain and Portugal whom she wishes to 
subdue — perish American commerce,^ so that French arms 
and French policy flourish and succeed. Well might Mr. 
Felix Grundy say, "France has somehow twisted a knot 
about our necks — we cannot untie it-— we must cut it by 
the sword." But in lieu of cutting the /aiot, Mr. Grundy 
and his associates have very sagaciously cut off the neck 
itself! ! ! 

I beseech all sober, serious, and patriotic men to ponder 
on these facts, this train of coincident circumstances, all of 
which are of public notoriety, and then say to what a dread- 
ful conclusion they lead. Can they, after that, be surprised 
at the present war ? There are men however, who say, that 
we ought not to analyze and weigh, and measure our com- 



55 

parative wrongs — ^that Britain has done us great injury — 
that the government are the exckisive judges, when the 
wrongs whieh we suffer demand reparation by the sword, 
and against whom the sword ought to be drawn, and they 
having decided this question, all good citizens ought not 
only to submit, but to support them with all their talents 
and fortunes. It is a war they say for pr'mciple^ and for 
our Aonor, and we must not stop to calculate consequences. 
Even if we knew that we should fail, we ought to fight and 
fall valiantly. If one could perceive in the conduct of our 
government a real sensibility to the wrongs done to our 
country — if tlieir sense of honor had appeared to be a con- 
stant, impartial and regular principle of action, there might 
be some weight in this remark — But if upon a short com- 
parison of their conduct towards the two belligerents it 
shall appear, that they are feelingly alive to every appear- 
ance of injury on the part of Great Britain, and are per- 
fectly insensible to the multiplied wrongs and insults, the 
kicks and cuffs, the robberies and plunders of France, we 
cannot bring ourselves to believe that they enter into this 
war to vindicate the Iionor of the United States. 

The injuries of Great Britain we have already enumera- 
ted and considered. They arc, the occasional impress- 
ment of our seamen, the blockade of French ports, and the 
orders in council, which in fact include the second. We 
have, however, no charge against Great Britain of breach 
of treaty — the only one she has made with us since the 
treaty of peace, she most honorably executed. Her ships 
of w^ar have covered every sea for twenty years past, and 
had she been actuated by the same dire and dreadful hos- 
tility to all free states as France has been, w^e should not 
at this moment have had such an immense commerce to 
be delivered up by our government as a defenceless prey 
to her numerous cruizers. The past unexampled prosper- 
ity of the United States, which has been the boast of both 
parties, of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison, as well as oth- 
ers, is the strongest proof which can be adduced of the 
general spirit of justice and moderation in the British 
councils. 



56 

- Another idea is very important — so honorable and so 
just has been the conduct of her merchants, so upright 
has been the deportment of her government towards our 
citizens \vho have traded to her ports, that many miUions 
of dollars of American property are at this moment depos- 
ited v/ith her for safe keepiny;, and during a twenty years' 
war not one case has occurred of a violation of the laws of 
hospitality, of seizure of our property confided to her,. or 
of unnecessary detention or embargo. 

Now let us reverse the picture. Hov/ many violations 
of the laws of civilized nations has France committed dur- 
ing the same period ? I shall not go back to the infamous 
conduct of her cabinet prior to Mr. Ellsworth's treaty — I 
limit myself in considering the amount of her \M'ongs to 
the last ten years only. That treaty of Mr. Ellsworth's 
stipulated that we should have a right to trade freely with 
her enemy, and from one enen^.y's port to another, and 
from her enemy's ports to those of France. Yet long prior 
to the Berlin decree, she forbade our entering her ports 
after having touched in Great Britain merely for orders and 
information^ The Berlin decree annulled this article of 
tlie treaty, or rather violated it in a shameless manner — yet 
our government never complained of this breach of treaty. 
France has professed to respect the doctrine of free ships 
making free goods — yet she has uniformly confiscated 
British property taken in our vessels, and has made it the 
sweeping pretext for condemning millions of bona fide 
American property. France has professed to favor free and 
neutral commerce, yet by her ordinances requiring certifi- 
cates of origin, slie virtually forbade the neutral trade in 
the productions of her enemy, and thus aimed a fatal blow 
at our carrying trade. 

France was the first nation on the civilized globe (at least 
since the introduction of admiralty courts) \vhich author- 
ized its cruisers, in violation of the laws of nations, to burn, 
sink and destroy neutral ships and cargoes on the high seas 
without any manner of trial. This injury has not been 
casual, but sytematic and repeated. Mr. Jefferson com- 
plained of it as the "most distressing mode in which belli- 
gerents exercise might contrary to right." Yet e^'ery 



57 

squadron which has issued from her ports since 1805, has 
continued the practice, and no apology has ever been made, 
nor any redress given for this barbarous and unexampled 
wrong. 

France too has adopted another expedient equally new 
among civilized states. She has seized property in her own 
ports which entered them under the safeguard of the law 
of nations ; a measure which no nation ever adopted, except 
on the breaking out of a war. For this wrong Mr. Mad- 
ison confbsses that we have not even the satisfaction of an 
apolog}^, or a promise of future recompence ; and Mr. 
Barlow says, that it ^\'iU be dull and heavy work to press 
France to' the smallest degree of reparation — he begged 
them only to promise somethings but they sturdily refused — 
the war, the compliance with the emperor's orders, may 
bring us a harvest of promises, but they will still be French 
ones. 

France also has treated us diplomatically with the great- 
est possible indignity. Turrcau declared xvar for us — but 
our national pride never rises at French insults. Cham- 
pagny told us that "we were without honor, without ener- 
gy, and less free than the colony of Jamaica." Mr. Mad- 
ison instructed Mr. Armstrong to notice this insult two 
vears since, and that is the very hist that we hear of it. 

How then can it be believed that our honor or our na- 
tional interest are the motives to this war, when we find 
that neither of them are regarded when France is a party to 
the question ? 

If it be said that we must chuse our enemy, that we can- 
not fight both England and France, then I reply, that our 
honor and interest required that we should fight France, 
if fight we must. 

Our Jionor^ because she has heaped upon us insult upon 
insult — because she was the first aggressor — because for 
no one wrong or insult has she tendered reparation ; whereas 
Britain has made us proposals respecting all her injuries, 
and has actually made a magnanimous apology and satisfac-' 
tion for the greatest. 



58 

Our interest required tlrat wc should fight France, if fight- 
ing bo indispensable, because in losing the trade of France 
we lose the sale of only three millions of dollars per annum 
— in giving up that of Great Britain we lose thirty millions 
-—France could not possibly hurt us more in war than she 
has always done in peace — Great Britain can ruin our com- 
merce, can inflict an injury which fifty years of wise policy 
cannot repair. 

But it is said that France has repealed her decrees, and 
Britain refuses to perfonn her promise to repeal her orders. 

To those \vho with a knowledge of the facts can con- 
tend for this proposition, all argument would be vain. 

If neither the reiterated declarations of the empcr-or, of 
his courts, of his marine officers, nor his personal decisions 
in the Dantzick cases, nor the daily destruction of our ships 
will convince men, " neither would they be convinced 
even if one should rise from the dead." [See Note 2.] 

But one remark ought not here to be omitted, and that 
is, that Britain has lately actually repealed her orders in 
council, to take effect when the French shall have repealed 
even in words her decrees — and she has declared that all 
ships taken after such a nominal repeal of the French de- 
crees shall be instantly restored in admiralty, without any 
jicw order to that effect — It is at such a moment as this, 
that we undertake to fight Great Britain for maintaining her 
orders in council and to join France in supporting and en- 
forcing her decrees ! ! I shall now quit this topic and take m}- 
leave "of my fellow-citizens, not because it is exhausted, 
for I scarcely know how to repress the many thoughts 
which occur on this fertile subject, but I aim at utility alone, 
and I have said as much as most readers will be disposed 
to read. 

If any man can conscientiously say, afteir the perusal of 
this candid, well authenticated, well supported^ statement of 
facts, that he thinks we have good cause of war against 
Great Britain, and that it is both politic and just to single 
her out in preference to France, why then let him buckle 
on his armour, and fight manfully, tliough fruidessly, in 
the cause of France ; but those of my fellow farmers, who 
with me think that the war is neither just nor expedient. 



59 

and who know it will be ruinous, will leave 4io constitution- 
al measure untried to put an end to so fatal a measure. 

But it may be said, and it is often said, it is no\v too late 
to discuss the merits of the declaration of war. The Ru- 
bicon is passed. It is your duty to submit and aid as 
much as possible in the prosecution of the war. It is not 
patriotic to vindicate the conduct of a nation whom your 
government has declared yoiu- enemy. Let us before we 
part, my fellow citizens, consider this subject. Every 
war is supposed to have some definite object. That object 
ought to be a legitimate and honest one, other,vise the war 
is unjust. It ought also to be a practicable and attainable 
one, otherwise the war is inexpedient. It ought not to 
expose us to greater evils and dangers than those which we 
would wish to remedy, otherwise it is rash and destructive. 
In order then to know for what we are to fight, and how 
long we ought to fight, and what we are to insist upon as 
an ultimatum from our enemy, it is necessary to discuss 
before the people, (who have as yet heard onhj one side oj 
the question from the inflamed speeches of inembei-s ot 
Congress) the whole merits of this war. 

If we ai*e bound forever to approve of this war, because 
a majority of six senators only, (no wiser nor better than 
ourselves) saw fit to declare it in complaisance to the pres- 
ident, why we may as well give up the right of suffrage at 
once to this oligarchy, and let them save us the trouble 
of future elections. But if we ha\e a right to change our 
rulers and to put in better men, men who love peace, rather 
than a hopeless war ; it is necessuy tliat we sIjOuUI also 
have the right and power to shew, that the present men have 
abused their trust by plunging us into an unjust war which 
might and ought to have been avoided. What Jimit ^vill 
our friends of freedom set to the right of discussing the 
merits or propriety of continuing the war ? 

Suppose after ten or twenty years of war, our posterity 
shall find the country impoverished, our commerce destroy- 
ed, our young men sacrificed in fruitless expeditions, the 
nation ground to powder by taxes and paper money — and 
suppose our enemy still triutnphani on thir ocean, and that 
all the prophecies about her downfall, shall pr.pve illusory, 



60 

would not some future patriot in 1832, be authorized to ad- 
dress the people, and assure them that the war was ruinous, 
that the points for which we were contending were not worth 
the contest, and that Britain it was evident could not be 
compelled to yield them, and that for these reasons, they 
opght to turn out those who were for continuing the war, 
and put in those who would restore peace ? 

Would not such a man be a true patriot ? 

Well then, where will you draw the line as to the time 
when the war may be opposed ? Shall it be fixed at six 
months, a year, ten years, or twenty ? 

I should say, that from the moment war is declared, those 
who consciefitious/t/ opposed its declaration have a right, and 
to preserve consistency, are boimd, to endeavour to bring 
about a peace by shewing the folly, the wickedness and the 
evils of the war. 

Nay, I go farther — the sooner you do this, and the more 
strenuously, and vigorously, and undauntedly you urge it, 
the more true patriotism you discover. For by these means 
you may put an end to the war before its evils are fully 
realised, and while the country still possesses some com- 
merce worth saving ; but there will be little or no merit 
in opposing the war some twenty years hence, when an 
oppressed, and impoverished, and desperate people rise as 
they will eventually do, and look around in despair for the 
authors of their calamities who will then seek refuge in caves 
and mountains, and call upon the rocks and hills to cover 
them. 

What is this doctrine that an insulted people hear? Why, 
that a measure big with the fate of seven millions of people 
passed in secret conclave, (and as the case jjiiglit be, and 
almost was, by a single vote, and that for aught they could 
know, a corrupt one,) is not only to be binding upon them 
as a law, (that they know and will submit to) but its jus- 
tice, its wisdom, its expediency must not be questioned ! ! 

You may change your rulers next November they tell you ; 
but you must not shew, diat Seavcr, and Cutis, and Rich- 
ardson, and Widgery, and Green, have sacrificed your inter- 
ests, — have abandoned you, helpless and forlorn, to the curses 
pf French alliance and the sweeping and resistless force of the 



British marine. These arc not my maxims. I say, me«, 
comprehend, weigh, consider, discuss the causes, secret and 
avowed, the progress and the consequences of this dreadful 
and needless war. Inquire who are its authors, and who are 
opposed to it. Compare them together — at the head of 
the friends of peace you will find Jay, and King, and Pink- 
ney, and Strong, and Pickering, and Oilman, and Gore, 
and Smith, and Otis, and Oriswold, and Hillhouse, and 
General Brooks, and all the other friends of Washington; 
and in flwor of it you will find Madison, and Dearborn, 
and Cutts, and Widgcry, and Seaver, and Austin, and 
Homans, and perhaps some of the colonels and lieutenant 
colonels, contractors, army agents and custom house spies. 
Take away in this state the men who hold places under 
the government, and there is scarcely a man of any distinc- 
tion who is not a friend to peace. Let then your suppli- 
cations, remonstrances, resolutions, groans and complaints 
be wafted on every breeze to the President's throne. Turn 
your eyes instantly towards such firm, upright, undeviating 
patriots as will save the commonwealth in this perilous time, 
and suffer those who have abused your confidence "?o r<?- 
tin'fi to private life;'''' but above all, preserve union and con- 
cert in all your measures. Recollect the old maxim of our 
revolution, which is still more important to be applied to 
Nezv England arid the commercial states now than it was 
THEN, United we stand, divided we fall. 

A NEW-ENGLAND FARIMER. 



1 






IS^OTES. 



JV'OTE 1. 

1[t may be asked, v«liy to much time is devoted to tlie argument upon tlic orders 

ih ('ouncil ? 

Wc answer. Because the old c implaints of impressment, and of hovering on 
our coasts, and the ti;eneral principles of blockade ailopted by Great Hritain, are 
O'lly the lii^ht and shade, the mere colouring of the principal ostensible cause of the 
war. Any man who vill review the course of nejoti^ilion between us and Great 
Ih-itain will perceive, that since the settlement of the aftair of the Chesapeake, the 
ordiM-s in Council of April, 1 S09, are the only ostensible causes of hostility which 
have been ur°;ed aijainst Gi-cat Britain. Mr. Erskine's arrai<gcment extended only 
to tlie satisfaction tor the attack on the Chesapeake and to the repeal of the orders 
in Coa-.icil. All the minor pnints in dispute were left untouched, and yet Mr. 
JVIaiiison undertook, on the ■unauthorized \}Von\i&Q of Mr. Erskine to restore Great 
Britain to the situation of the most favored nation, upon the settlement of the 
(Chesapeake affair, and the re])eal of the orders in Council only, leaving the other 
j)retended causes of war wholly unadjusted. 

We are now however at -war, and in order to know for what we enp;ag'e in this 
.dreadful calamity, we are to seek the answer in the terms of Erskine's arrange- 
ment, Mr. Madison having restored Great Britain to her trade with us by that ae- 
j^oiiation, and he was not authorized to do this until Great Britain ceased to violate 
our neutral rights. 

We have a ri^Jit then to say, on this authority of Mr. Madison, that the orders 
in < Council are the sole cause of the war, and those -ivho -wish for peace must either 
believe that those orders are not. Jxistif able causes of war, or must contend, that 
thtir repeal must be madti a sine qua non, an indispensable condition of any treaty 
of i)eace. 

Nou', believing as I do, that their repeal will not be granted by Great Britain un- 
til the united arms of France and America reduce her to the lowest degree of hu- 
miliation and weakness, or until the Berlin and Milan decrees are repealed ; and 
helicving, that it is neither just, nor for our interest, to compel her to rescind them 
■v.hile those of her enemy anterior in point of tiaie are in full force, I have thought 
it expedient to endeavour to satisfy the citizens of our country, that the rei)cai of 
the orders in Council ou;j;Iit not to be an ultimatum in our demands in a ne.i;otiatiou 
tor peace. If we arc not persuaded of this, it is vain and hopeless to clamour foi- 
peace. Peace we probably never shall have, if we contend for the repeal of the 
orders in Council, unless !•" ranee should revoke bona fide her decrees. 

It will become now a point of honor with our enemy to maintain them. Yet if, as 
I\Ir. Madison and his frietids contend, the oi-ders in (.Council are a signal act of injus- 
tice, wholly unprovoked and unwarranted by the laws and usages of nations, no 
honorable man could ask the government to make peace while those orders remain 
in force. 

It is because I believe, that those orders were so far ns respected France, the 
n^^rtiisov, jtcsiiflable. It is because I believe that a moderate share of spirit and 
honorable impartiality on our part would have procured the repeal of the French 
decrees, or at least have induced Great Britain to rescind her ordei'S in Council, tUsit 
I have entered so much at large into this ar5;ument. 

I now advance an opinion, which I fully believe will appear hereafter to be cor- 
rect, that until Me can bring ourselves to view this question citndid.'!/ as between 
two powerful belligerents, the one fii;htii;g for existence and the other for conquest, 
tuitil we can jierceive that Great Britain was constrained by tlie paramount law of 
self preservation to retaliate on her enemy her own iinexamph-'ii itijiistlce, we must 
vonteiit ourselves with a perpetual war, (unless Fi'anec should recede from her sys- 
tem) or else hail as a blessing, the greatest possible of all calamities lorn, the sub- 
jugation of Great Britain by the common enemy of the human race, 'i'hose who 
•can derive consolation from such a prospect, may not heed wu" arguments, or give 
credit to our motives, but sob^-r men will reflect and weigh the dreadful conse- 
quences before they decide to contend for so questionable and so uniiapor'a;il a 
ooint. 



•t^... 



63 

JTote 2. 



.^- 



Bdfnapartc has sucli a Ihorougli contempt for Iiis new aUv, "Mv. Madison, that he 
takes no pains to spare his leelipijs or support his charactoc. Now a ^llo^•t, simple, 
nominal repeal of llie Berlin :iiul Milan decrees wonhl have heli)eil Mr. Mailisor* 
viiic/t, and not have injured the emperor's syst<-ni in tlie least ; for he nii^iiit still have- 
condemned under special decrees, as he h:is latdv done — Im; mii;ht still have boruL 
every American ship on the ocean, and never have li^d his imperial repose distiirhcit 
by the unquiet complaints of his new ally. 15ut as if purposely to proclaim to llie 
world his utter conlempt of our j^overnniciit, and hi»absolii6e control over it, he has 
declared on nof less than ten public occasions that his decrees -ieerc not repealed. 
And why shoidd he not, since he found us lunrcliini:; on as straitly as lie could wisU 
to fulfil his orders of fighting Great-Britain ? The kist arrival from Europe contains 
another repetition of this insult and contradiction ot" AFi-. Madison. 

The Moiiiteur ( Bonaparte's official paper) declares "that the French decrees were 
not repealed \>\i\i respect to Americans till April 'iS, 1811," thatia Vo^iiy, six monthly 
after our president's pi'oelamation deelarina; them repealed in November, ISIO, and 
after the arrival in France of news of our non-intereourse act of March, ISll, 
•which was construed to be a causina; our ris;hts to be respected ; so it now appears- 
that the condition annexed to the Due de Cadore's letter of August 5, 1810, was a 
condition precedent. But the P'rench dvcrees, according to the Monlteur, weiv 
■not repealed \\\ May last, for it concludes with this sentence — "Let Kngland revoke 
liev new legislation of blockade and her orders in council, and llie ISerlin and Milan 
decrees tvill be annuUet!, and all neutrals treated in Fratice as tiiey were previoivs 
to the present war." This was at the very iiioniciit wlieu Madison M'as writing a 
manisesto declaring the decrees repealed. 

Now wliat neutrals f we would ask, are there in the present war .' Upon when* 
are these repeals and promises of Bonaparte to operate ? At the time when the- 
article in the Monitctfi' was written, America wss a sort of neutral — a neutral i;i 
every thing but i:n|ffirtiality iu its dealings ; now, alas ! Europe and .\merica do not 
contain a single neutral state. Britain stan<ls alose against tlie world, defending her 
right to retaliate her enemy's injustice on hiniselc", and ii'i? have just joined France 
for the avowed object, as the .Aloniteur tells us, of comi)eUing Kngland to withdraw 
her retaliatori/ orders, after wiiich, it informs us, Fi-ance will revoke her prior 
decrees, (that is to say, if siie pleases, and can do 7J(J better.) But wlicn Finglan<J 
is reduced to tiiat stale of humiliation^ I think his majesty's pioniiscs wixild, like 
JBflT)?/ former ones, he forgot ten. 

JSTote 3, 

Tlve pcojdc are to be deluded into the belief tTiat this war is to be prosecntctJ 
withoat the imposition of new taxes ; Congress have therefore postponed the tax- 
bills^ — but they arc o\\\y postponed. After the election, when Mr. .Sladison's place 
will l>e secure, they will be passed, or if not, an inxmensc debt (if tliey can procuri; 
roans) will accuniidate, and then the oidy boon we shall hav will be that our children 
will be taxed instead ol ourselves. Now tlie liability to t 'cation at a future da). 
«nd the certainty that that day must ai rive, actually reduces t'.ie present value of oui- 
houses, our farms, and the price of labor nearlv in as great a degree as immediate 
impositions or taxes. The future taxes indeetl will be enhanced in proportion 
to the accumulation of debt, and will be more .severely felt than if gradually impoeeil. 
Public ci-edit will in tiie mean time suffer, and the price of every thing which the- 
government njay require for the support of the war will be greatly and neeillcislv 
enhanced. 

Ti»e people, particularlv of the Northern States, are nov/ in fact taxed for the 
war, and will soon feel its pressure by ilie diminished value of their real estates, by 
the reduced price of labor, and the difficulty of finding cnii>loymcnt, and by liitr 
dreadful increase of the prl:;c of all foreign cor,imo'!i'irs, wjiicfi hnvc br;' 'ime niiucit 
n»sessaj-'ies of life. 



# »v 




■f?.; 



.^'^:^ 




f 



L:iA'r'Q4 






